

“The result has been a progressively widening gap in the real military power of organizations that can and those that cannot cope with complexity, but little change in the outcomes of wars fought between equally skilled opponents and no revolutionary discontinuities in the nature of warfare.”²¹

Biddle agrees that technological advancement will “provide increasingly one-sided outcomes in major theater wars.” But he notes that, as the Gulf War demonstrates, “such wars are already very one-sided” and “it is not clear that a continuation of this trend would provide any meaningful difference.”²²

More importantly, Biddle contends that technological change in and of itself “is neither necessary nor even conducive to success.” The relationship between technological complexity and battlefield success “has not been significantly altered by recent developments and is unlikely to be changed by technologies on the drawing board.” As with Cohen, he points to the importance of skill in managing technological changes in warfare. In the 21st century, war will “be mainly a continuation of a century long increase in the importance of skill in managing complexity.” The effectiveness of technologies will still depend on human behavior “and especially on the counter-measures adopted by the technology’s targets to reduce their exposure.” Tanks have become more lethal and have greater ranges, but complex counter-measures can reduce the effects of their fire-power and compel them to move at less than capable speeds. And skilled combatants will learn to provide fewer lucrative targets for the deep attack technologies heralded by RMA enthusiasts.²³

Biddle’s views on the importance of skill and human behavior in managing technological to military advantage are confirmed in Timothy Thomas’ recent analysis, “Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority.” He points out that in spite of NATO’s “near total information superiority, its battlespace awareness was manipulated by Serbian forces more often than expected. When human and software interpreters of intelligence information were fooled, it resulted in munitions wasted on fake or incorrect targets and in bad assessments of the actual situation on the ground.” Mission tasks and damage assessments were also affected.²⁴

As revealed in Congressional testimony, the American and allied personnel were not prepared to conduct information operations. In some cases there was a lack of skills in targeting, intelligence analysis, and translation. “Information superiority” he concludes, “allowed NATO to know almost every thing about the battlefield, but NATO analysts didn’t always understand

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.* pp. 30-1.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 31.

²⁴ Timothy L. Thomas, “Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority,” *Parameters* (30) (Spring 2000), p. 13.