

were, and sanctions.... There are admittedly occasions when these instruments are necessary, but such occasions are very exceptional; and often, when these crude instruments are used, they prove counter-productive – especially when used in dealings with self-respecting leaders of peoples.

Art of persuasion

The main instrument of diplomatic negotiation is the art of persuasion – based on genuine goodwill, understanding of and respect for the other side's major interests in whatever the field is that you are dealing with, and involving the insight to discern, and then the ability to propound convincingly, an effective method of serving his side's real interests that is harmonious with a way of serving your side's.

Finding and getting recognition for common interests that outweigh conflicting interests – that is the main thing.

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Everyone knows that, in a national parliament, the individual M.P.'s influence does not depend on the relative size or wealth of his particular constituency. It depends, especially over a period of time, on his demonstrated ability to evolve and to articulate and advance proposals and actions that will serve the general interest – of course including, at least in most instances, and in the long-term, those of his own constituents. It depends on earning the confidence and respect of his fellows.

The analogy between this obvious fact of domestic politics and the reality of a country's international influence, or that of one of its representatives prepared and able to act on the analogy, is only very partial, but in my experience, far from remote.

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In the years immediately after the [Second World] War, I thought that, if Stalin, instead of using the Red Army occupation to install satellite regimes, had sent the Bolshoi Ballet and the Red Army Choir on tour throughout Europe and North America, the goodwill of public opinion already gained would have been electrified by these superb artists, and that Communist parties, which had played so important

a part in resistance in Western Europe after 1942, would probably have not merely participated in but very possibly soon have led coalition governments in Italy, France, and perhaps elsewhere.

But I also realised that Stalin did not *want* Communist parties in power where he couldn't control them; his aim was was not the spread of Communist ideology but the extension of an empire that could be run from Moscow. At about that time, he gave some exceedingly bad guidance to Mao Tse-tung, who didn't act on it. I have wondered whether Stalin's bad advice was because Stalin didn't understand China, or because he did not want a Communist regime to get power there and be in a position to operate independently. Tito, you will recall, also got power on his own, not through installation by an occupying or liberating Red Army on his territory. And this soon made a difference.

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Error in Chinese relations

Not only was the official American assessment of the Chinese Communists wrong, but their action (and I regret to add Canada's action) was wrong, and would have been wrong even if the official American assessment had been correct. In the last few months of 1949, we all knew that the Chinese Communists were about to get unchallenged control of Mainland China, and that the Nationalists were going to move the last remaining forces to Taiwan, or Formosa (as we then called it), by the turn of the year.

I was then alternate representative on the Security Council and deputy head of Canada's mission to the United Nations. I started a campaign to urge Canada, and the Americans and the British, to recognize Communist China as soon as Chiang Kai-shek left the mainland.

I pressed my case that the West should recognize Communist China on the grounds that non-recognition of the stable government of an important country was stupid and did nothing but harm to both parties. I admitted, of course, that I had no direct knowledge of China; but I knew a lot about the U.S.S.R.... Under American leadership, most of the West had taken 16 years after the revolution in 1917 to

recognize that the Soviet regime was here to stay. This delay had accomplished nothing for the West, but it had helped to confirm in the minds of many Soviet people the idea that the West was irretrievably hostile to them, and it had helped Stalin erect a psychological Iron Curtain around his country and encourage xenophobia among the Russian people....

My representations were, I was assured, considered very seriously in Washington as well as in Ottawa, and after a few weeks I was told by an Assistant Secretary of State that I could be sure the U.S. would recognize China well before the end of 1946; they would not make the mistake which they agreed had proved costly in withholding recognition and diplomatic relations so long from the U.S.S.R. But they wanted to have negotiations with China about such things as the locations of consulates and trade and financial relations and so on, and since in negotiations American recognition would be a valuable counter, it should be saved for use in the talks, rather than granted as an instrument to facilitate talks.

I pointed out that this implied that the exchange of diplomatic missions and recognition was a concession by one side rather than a reciprocal adjustment; that this might unnecessarily offend a proud and potentially friendly government; and that, given the history of American policy on recognitions, and the probability that the Kuomintang leaders would lobby Congress against recognition, delay might merely result in the American Executive finding its hands tied in a straight-jacket. I was told not to worry. But this is, of course, what happened. The visits of Secretary Kissinger and then President Nixon to China a few years ago were brilliant and constructive initiatives, and have proved very useful. It is a pity that such moves did not come 20 years earlier.

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...Normally, non-recognition and the absence of diplomatic contacts does, in my view, nothing but harm. Personally, if Satan himself established a kingdom on this earth (and he has come close on occasion, as in Hitler's Germany), I should want to have one of my best ambassadors there to keep a close eye on things.

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