

bravely, but he shirks consequences oftentimes—nay, generally—like a coward. He is the ancient Pistol of English diplomacy. As Fluellan said of the Shakesperian Pistol "I'll assure you a uttered as prave 'ords at the pridge as you shall see in a summer's day." With his appointee at the British Museum, librarian Pianizzi, he was a fellow of Mazzini and murderous conspirators and spies in the undermining of Austrian rule in Italy. He was right—very right in his aim—we all know that now; but what shall we say of his methods? Poor Louis Napoleon was executed for his; Mazzini has been left with a ragged reputation; what about the "most purest" of all people, the G. O. M.? If the *carbonari* indelibly defiled the robes of the French emperor did his association with them do credit to Mr. Gladstone? Some men seem to think so. It is only a question of whose ox is gored. *Mais revenons.* Mr. Gladstone spouted gloriously for Italy and its independence as a reunited nation. Was one single regiment of British troops or one ship of the British navy ever used to make Italy what it is? Not one. Only "prave 'ords at the pridge." I heard his speech in favour of the poor Neapolitan protestants confined in a dungeon. It was the most eloquent speech I ever heard, but "prave 'ords at the pridge" again. Who forgets his giving away the Ionian Islands out of sentimental literary regard for Greece? We all remember how, not long before a general election, he spoke more "prave 'ords" against the Austrian Government to win radical votes, and ate the humblest of humble-pie—off the Austrian table—when the election gave him power to do as he liked. We all remember, too, how he rushed into a most just war against the most utterly brutal and cruel of all oppressors of native races—the Boers of South Africa; and after the loss of a single battle made a most abject and sneaking peace. We remember also that he rushed us into a war in Egypt against the pretensions of Arabi Pashi, and succeeding through the bravery of the British forces, sneaked out of the fight and left poor Gordon, sent out on duty in the Soudan, to be assassinated for want of succours which might have been and were not sent in time. Does he never dream of Gordon in the night watches, or has he sought and received some sort of absolution for this complicity in murder? And the brave words are yet so brave, that one exalts his sentimentality above the calm wisdom of our great statesman-ruler! So the mob ever goes; but surely sagacious writers on public affairs should not pander to mob thought or hysterical faddism. Look at it in this wise: while other powers stand idly by, Britain, which is the greatest of all Moslem powers, is to give mortal defiance and combat to the "Father of the Faithful." And this, while the ecclesiastical advisers of the Sultan urge him to display the green flag and proclaim a holy war. This would make England's position in India and Egypt very interesting if not very secure. Our Queen is Empress of India as well as Queen of Great Britain, and the British dependencies on the four continents, all her Indian possessions and a great part of her African influence, is to be sacrificed to make a holiday for the four powers, and satisfy the Armenian missionaries. She knows better than that and so does her great Prime Minister.

As I said above, Britain is very great, but not quite omnipotent, as Jingo writers daily assume. She has given way perforce several times, and may do so again. Against the vehement protestations of Australia she partitioned New Guinea instead of holding all. She did not interfere in Hawaii, though much urged to do so—seeing possession or protectorate there must have been of immense advantage to her. She gave France a free hand in Madagascar; she yielded much in Zanzibar and Samoa to Germany; and has shown, in many cases, a prudent common sense, on which all statesmanship is founded. But, and here comes our cause for boasting, neither Salisbury, nor Beaconsfield, nor Palmerston has allowed a Britain to be injured without insisting on redress. Senator Frye, our much-hating Yankee neighbour, grew eloquent over that phase of the foreign policy of Britain. Let us then, who profit by that policy and aid so little to support it, not revile the old mother when she finds, as now, that all her strength is needed to take care of herself and her children, but thank her and her Minister for all that is being done in our behalf. Threatened in Asia by Russia and France; in Africa (North and West) by France and (South, East and West) by Germany; and in America by the United States, are we, whom she

strains every nerve to protect and to benefit, fit persons to revile her because she declines a Quixotic crusade in Armenia? To me such utterances on our part mark, in the highest degree, the most atrocious, if it be not ignorant, ingratitude.

"*Liberavi unimam meam,*" and thanking you for the opportunity.
A VETERAN (*in politics*).

NE SUTOR ULTRA CREPIDAM.

SIR,—I have been very much interested in reading the contributions of Mr. Armour and Mr. Gordon Waldron on the subject of "Evolution," and as to the main point at issue I would not have the impertinence to interfere. Apart however from the question of the "modern theory of evolution," in which I have always taken a great interest, I would like to point out that Mr. Waldron's criticism has a bitter sting in its tail couched in these elegant words "*Ne sutor ultra crepidam.*" From one who has just concluded "with the utmost diffidence this examination of errors" this is certainly a polite way in which to take leave of an opponent. However the questioning critical spirit is not monopolised by "scientists" and we are not disposed to swallow a sentence like this either because it is "old" or because it is an "adage." "Let the cobbler stick to his last" may be a smart saying, but sometimes there is more impertinence than justice in the application of it. If what is meant is that a man should not dogmatise on matters that he does not understand, we may all admit its truth, though we should be diffident in applying it to others, however relentless we may be in its application to our own conduct; but if it means that we must keep closely to our own professional grooves and not on any account wander outside of it then it is a false and dangerous doctrine. Had this advice ever been accepted literally, many noble lives would have been cramped and destroyed. One of the dangers of our time is the danger of a narrow specialism, because the weakness of our age lies near to its strength. Surely it is not a thing to be regretted that lawyers take an interest in natural science and in the theories or "hypotheses" of scientific men; and even if one of them should venture to criticise Mr. Herbert Spencer he might hope to have his errors gently and "diffidently corrected and receive a little encouragement to continue his biological researches so that he also may learn "to think correctly," but alas he is warned off the sacred ground with a "*Ne sutor ultra crepidam.*" Well, the lawyer has my sympathy; his legal training has no doubt fitted him to take care of himself in arguments of many kinds, but that which I am inclined to resist is the dogmatism which breathes through this *ne sutor* etc. Is "evolution" to be inflated until it becomes a world-explaining hypothesis and must I be ruled out of court when it is considered because I am not a biological expert?

But evidently the old adage does not apply to the scientist, he cannot be content with correcting Mr. Armour's errors, he can correct an error "which is probably a correct statement of the inclination of most minds" "What is called the law of cause and effect is a generalization of experience." Exactly! Who said so? This is not a fact of "natural science," perhaps it is another "hypothesis" probable or improbable. It opens up a series of important questions. We want to know whose experience generated "the law of cause and effect" and when the generalization took place. If it simply expresses "the uniform relation and sequence of phenomena," what is the relation. Is there no difference between *post hoc* and *propter hoc*? Thus Mr. Waldron leads us into the realms of logic, metaphysics, and theology. But here we have one consolation: "science thinks; or seems to think, correctly." How can science be said to think, whether we regard it as a reasoned body of knowledge or a collection of "hypotheses"? Scientists think and lawyers think, and because as rational beings they know that only truth can meet their needs and stand the tests of life, they seem to think correctly. That is to bring their thoughts into harmony with the nature of things. Notwithstanding the differences of Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, Tyndel, and Hoenel I believe that there is a reasoned body of knowledge called "natural science," which rests securely upon the strongest evidence but I could not hold that belief upon the principles advocated in the last paragraph of Mr. Waldron's lively article.

W. G. JORDAN.

Strathroy, Ont.