perfected his examinations both of authorities and principles, stating his conclusions in forms to be enduring. When, therefore, he says something contrary to our prior ideas, we do not instantly condemn it, but institute a careful examination, to see whether, after all, we were not mistaken. With this caution, let us proceed.

Of prime importance in a treatise is the ability, in its author, accurately to discern the multitudinous distinctions in the law, and to state them with unvarying precision. How stands the work before us under this head?

The author commences by enumerating four causes which, he says, have "recently" revolutionized much of the doctrine of his subject—hence the necessity for his book. As we cannot examine everything, let us begin by seeing with what discrimination and accuracy of statement he deals with one of them. It is, in his own words, "the relinquishment, by England and the United States, of the maxim that the place of the commission of a crime has exclusive jurisdiction of its punishment, and the extension of such jurisdiction, with certain limitations, to the country of arrest." The connection in which this sentence stands, and the use of the word "country," not county, in the closing part of it, show that the author is treating of the question as between two nations—not of the venue, where no inter-state question arises. And we are startled by the statement, not by way of imparting information, but as of a fact known to all, that, within certain limits, we, if we can catch an Englishman who has committed an offence in his own country, may punish him for it, and the British Government may do the like with an American; the two nations having relinquished "the maxim that the place of the commission of a crime has exclusive jurisdiction of its punishment." And this has been done "recently." And it is one-quarter of the reason why a new book was needed. Well, as the author knows better than we, of course the presumption is overwhelming that he is right. So, let us proceed. Further over we shall come to the treaties or statutes by which this has been effected, or to the decisions in which the courts of the two countries have abandoned *stare decisis*, and announced the new laws. But, no; reading on we find that there is claimed to be no such doctrine; it is this: "In criminal cases the country of arrest has jurisdiction over all offences committed against the laws of such country, with the limitation that, as to offences committed in foreign countries, such country of arrest has jurisdiction only of offences committed against its sovereignty." We see no very great objection to this statement, which is a different thing from the other; but we look in vain for the authorities to show that the doctrine is, as one of international or inter-state law, "recent." In England and the United States there have been, at different periods, some changes as to the place of trial, or the tribunal; but these are local questions, having nothing to do with international relations. Nor, as to these, are we informed of anything special and "recent." Yet the assumed "recent" change is one of the four reasons for writing the book!

A single instance of the want of accuracy, or of stating a doctrine in two conflicting forms, should not condemn a book, for probably no author ever wrote much without committing some slip of the sort. Yet, when we find that the very motive for writing is the assumed existence of what does not exist, and of what with him is one thing on one page and another thing on another, we are put fairly on enquiry concerning his performance. We do not even for this reject it, but look into it further.

Turning over the pages, we come to a chapter largely occupied with showing that, should a certain question of law, assumed not to have been directly adjudged, be presented hereafter to the courts, it ought, in just reason and established principle, and in harmony with decisions already made, to be decided in a way mentioned. Looking into the authorities, we find that this exact question has been frequently adjudged, that there neither is nor ever was any real dispute about it, and that the decision is directly the reverse of what our author says it should, and probably will be. And we note that, to sustain his erroneous proposition, he actually cites and even states some of the cases which support the contrary, apparently not aware of their effect. I have not room here to explain the matter fully, but, in brief, it is as follows:

[To be continued.]