

powers to construct a new and formidable fleet during the winter.

I will not, however, give credit to their exertion in such a degree as to imagine the King's troops will be prevented passing Lake Champlain early in the summer, but will suppose the operations of the army to begin from Crown-Point.

But as the present means to form effectual plans to lay down every possible difficulty, I will suppose the enemy in great force at Ticonderoga: the different works there are capable of admitting twelve thousand men.

I will suppose him also to occupy Lake George with a considerable naval strength, in order to secure his retreat, and afterwards to retard the campaign; and it is natural to expect that he will take measures to block up the roads from Ticonderoga to Albany by the way of Skenesborough, by fortifying the strong ground in different places, and thereby obliging the King's army to carry a weight of artillery with it; and, by felling trees, breaking bridges, and other obvious impediments, to delay, though he should not have power or spirit finally to resist, its progress.

The enemy thus disposed upon the side of Canada, it is to be considered what troops will be necessary, and what disposition of them will be most proper to prosecute the campaign with vigour and effect.

I humbly conceive the operating army (I mean exclusively of the troops left for the security of Canada) ought not to consist of less than eight thousand regulars, rank and file. The artillery required in the memorandums of General Carleton, a corps of watermen, two thousand Canadians, including hatchet-men and other workmen, and one thousand or more savages.

It is to be hoped that the reinforcement and victualling-ships may all be ready to sail from the Channel and from Corke on the last day of Mar