

merely a temporary stage of thought when he speaks of imagination as "the effect of the understanding on the sensibility"; for here what he elsewhere regards as a product of pure imagination is affirmed to be a product of the relation between the categories and the manifold of sense. Of course the schemata imply the specific manifold of space and time, and therefore partly belong to the metaphysic of nature, as distinguished from the metaphysic of knowledge in general; but in an investigation into the conditions of knowledge this specific element does not properly come under consideration. The categories are therefore simply the universal aspect of knowledge, as logically distinguished from the particular aspect, and abstracted from the relations which give them meaning and significance.

(5.) So much has just been said in regard to conception, that a very few words in regard to judgment as treated by Kant will be sufficient. As the categories are potentialities of synthesis, so judgment is the act of synthesis itself. The manifold of sense has to be reflected on the universal forms of thought and perception before there can be any real knowledge, and this process of reflection is judgment. We must, therefore, free our minds from the misleading associations which arise from the attempted assimilation of the analytical and the synthetical judgment. "To think," Kant tells us, "is to judge," and judging consists "in referring conceptions to objects through perceptions." Now, in strict propriety, this formula is only applicable to the analytical judgment of formal logic, which rests upon the supposition that objects, with the full complement of their attributes, first exist full-formed in consciousness, and are afterwards referred to an abstract universal. Accordingly, if we follow the letter of Kant's