

had not yet been settled in Congress but \$3.2 billion was the level agreed on in the House appropriation bill 'mark-up'. Over the years it could cost \$25 billion but the United States would have an effective defence system against SS-18s.

The U.S. delegate from the House Foreign Affairs Committee commented that the Administration and the President personally were very committed to SDI. In the House there was cautious approval of the research program. However there were questions such as was an 80 per cent shield enough when a 20 per cent rate of penetration would have horrifying results? Out of a \$300 billion defence budget the cost of SDI research could be absorbed, but the cost of deployment, which would be in the trillions, was not feasible. Among the House Democrats there was concern about SDI's destabilizing effect and what impact it would have on the arms control negotiations. However, there was some hope that it could be the first item of agreement at Geneva and could be the cornerstone of a new treaty.

A Canadian Senator deplored the popular term "Star Wars" to describe the SDI program. He noted that Sir Geoffrey Howe had cautioned that the United States should not go beyond research without gaining the approval of the allies first. He observed that only the research aspect was at present being considered and there was no certainty that it would succeed in resolving some enormous difficulties. In addition, since only an 80 per cent success rate was envisioned, space battles would not leave the earth unscathed. Nevertheless, this delegate maintained that SDI research should go ahead. Man can never turn his back on an opportunity to pursue knowledge, he said. Canada should participate in the research phase not only for the technological spin-off but also because it would like to participate in future decision-making.

The Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs stated that the House had supported SDI funding but not as large an amount as the President's initial request. Nor should there be any testing since this would violate the ABM Treaty. A State Department definition was attempting to get around this problem but this spokesman considered this an unwise move. Moreover he found very worrying the comments by officials about "scrapping SALT II" and "dumping the ABM". It was difficult to get a clear version of what SDI was and what it would accomplish, this participant said, but the research phase was clearly "locked in". Both the United States and the USSR were already doing the research, the President had just put it on the table. Another U.S. member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee said that he doubted there would even be 40 votes in Congress against SDI. The United States was definitely going ahead. What was Canada going to do, he queried?

The first Canadian spokesman commented that he did not see why Canada needed to be in lock-step with the United States. He asked why President Reagan needed the allies' involvement. He thought the request could be counterproductive for the bilateral relationship with Canada. Moreover, it could be important for the United States to have an ally for

'conflict resolution', i.e., in NATO, but if Canada became involved in SDI, such a role would be limited. The United States had clearly shifted its policy away from a basic reliance on MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction). As for SDI being the 'biggest bargaining chip', this delegate said MIRV, the hydrogen bomb and other weapons had all, in their time, been touted as a solution to the problem. The USSR was not going to sit idly by. Therefore, SDI was not a panacea and it was not in Canada's interest. The United States should "go it alone". If the United States continued to demand allies' involvement, it could create an anti-Americanism. In response, a U.S. Congressman, who said he had supported SDI in the House vote, commented that if the President had failed to offer SDI participation to the allies he would also have been criticized for that.

Another Canadian agreed the President had to consult the allies but she would like to see the consultation process go even further and include the USSR. Earlier President Reagan had suggested that research on ballistic missiles be shared with the Soviet Union but Mr. Mondale "had shot the idea down". She reiterated the concern of the Canadian public that the SDI reflected a "fighting mentality" based on the assumption of a nuclear exchange rather than a continuation of a deterrence policy.

Some doubt was expressed by a third Canadian member that widespread public concern existed in Canada on this issue. However, he considered that the Canadian government would undoubtedly agree to participate in SDI for a number of reasons: without participating, Canada would drop behind in technological capabilities associated with SDI research; there could be employment spin-offs associated with participation; the government's policy was to increase the Canadian defence commitment; and the government wanted to build a closer relationship with the United States.

In the opinion of another delegate, Canadian participation in SDI should not be based on the expectation of increased technological capabilities or employment. In any case this participant had been informed that only about 400 Canadian jobs could be involved. He asked the U.S. side whether the "bargaining chip at the arms negotiation table" argument was the principal reason for supporting SDI.

The U.S. Senator replied that this was only one argument and not the main one. In his opinion, SDI was the beginning of an important new era of defence, just as the anti-ballistic missile had been. While it was true the USSR at present had superior space shuttle capabilities, their research was compartmentalized and they were not modernizing as quickly as the United States. If an SDI system were successful in stopping the use of strategic missiles, the next steps could involve theatre weapons, then conventional weapons.

#### *Arms Control Negotiations*

A U.S. Congressman began the exchange on this topic by noting what a welcome development the recommencement of the Geneva negotiations were despite the fact the two sides