

by such passions. It should be a body that should look before and after, that would not be influenced by the passions of the hour, but would look upon every question in a calm and judicial way. The principal duty of the body would not be to originate legislation, although it should do that to a certain extent; but the principal use of the upper House under the British system is to check and revise the work of the popular body. That body is likely to do things hastily, to pass measures under the influence of those ebullitions of popular passion that I have spoken about; and where a measure is passed under the influence of that spirit and the upper House thinks it is not likely to promote the welfare of the State, it is the duty of the upper House to resist the popular passion of the hour. Of course, if after the people have had time to carefully consider a question they still remain of the same mind, then as a rule it has been the practice, at any rate under the British system, that the upper House gives way. Even when the legislation of the lower House is not such as to be objectionable on the whole, it may be imperfect—it may be legislation that has passed through its various stages hurriedly. Then it is the duty of the upper House to revise that work and to atone for the want of care and study devoted to it in the other Chamber. The two principal functions of the upper House under the British system are to check and prevent injudicious legislation and to revise legislation that is imperfect.

HON. MR. ABBOTT—Hear, hear.

HON. MR. POWER—That is what the House ought to be in itself. Then, in addition to that, an ideal House ought to be a House whose work would be understood and appreciated by the people, and a House that would be respected by the people and in whose proceedings the people would take almost as deep an interest as they take in the proceedings of the popular branch.

HON. MR. ABBOTT—You would want an ideal people for that.

HON. MR. POWER—I was just going to say that that is hardly practicable. The people will take a keener interest in their representatives in the lower House, in

those who have come from them last, than they will in representatives who stand a little further aloof from them. Talking of the qualities that I have indicated as being those that we should find in an ideal Senate, the question is whether or not those qualities are likely to be found in a nominated House. The hon. gentleman from Shediac and the hon. gentleman from Ottawa thought that a nominated House could not be in touch with the people; and of course they will not be as much in touch with the people as a House directly elected by the people; but, at the first blush at any rate, it would appear that a nominated House would not be more unfit to discharge the functions of an upper Chamber than a House elected by the Legislatures of the Provinces. In order to indicate that a nominated council is not regarded under the English system as being inconsistent with responsible government, I wish to call attention to the fact that there are, under responsible government, a number of nominated Legislative Councils. For instance, in Nova Scotia, before Confederation the Legislative Council was nominated; it was the same way in New Brunswick; and it appears from the Confederation Debates as reported in the volume which hon. gentlemen have seen, that the representatives of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick at the Quebec Conference were opposed to any change in the system of appointing the Legislative Councils of those Provinces. I know, speaking of the Legislative Council of Nova Scotia, that it has been a very respectable body and is so still, and discharges very useful functions in parliamentary work. Then the Province of Newfoundland has a nominated Legislative Council; and I was rather surprised, when the hon. gentleman from Ottawa was dealing with the Australian colonies, that he left out of sight the fact that the oldest, and, I think, the most respectable of all the Australian colonies, New South Wales, has a nominated Legislative Council. The constitutional difficulties which have arisen in Victoria through conflicts between the two branches of the Legislature have not occurred in New South Wales, and I do not think that there has ever been any complaint of the character or doings of the Legislative Council of that colony. To return to our own House, I stated—in fact