

The Address—Mr. Broadbent

flows logically from everything the Prime Minister has said here today and, indeed, what he said before. Canada should indicate now that it will support that resolution at the United Nations.

Second, we should commit ourselves to spending on disarmament a much larger sum in terms of research and in terms of analysis than the Government has heretofore committed itself, and this should be a fixed and growing percentage of our defence budget.

Third, we should follow with concrete action the Prime Minister's stated objective of opposing the development of anti-satellite weapons. Specifically, because of our own involvement in the technology in this area this should entail the refusal by the Government of Canada to develop any satellite technology for any military purpose whatsoever. That, as the Prime Minister knows, would entail a real but specific change in policy. In addition, we should offer to join the international satellite monitoring agency proposed by the Government of France.

Fourth, and very important, we must openly declare our opposition to the first use of nuclear weapons.

Some Hon. Members: Hear, hear!

Mr. Broadbent: In my view, the Prime Minister was absolutely right to call into question the current NATO strategy which is grounded on the first-use principle. In so doing, I say he joins a growing number of people, including the Commander-in-Chief of the NATO forces himself who openly expressed skepticism and did not feel he was doing something inappropriate about the efficacy of such strategy. In addition, many Canadians, Americans and Europeans, including a group of Members of Parliament representing all Parties in the House of Commons, not long ago called this strategy openly into question.

I think it would be useful at sometime to talk about this in the House because although the Prime Minister made passing reference to it abroad, we have not had discussion here about why he personally had some doubts about it. I would like to hear the views of the Leader of the Opposition as well. I want to state as clearly as I can why I think this is an outmoded strategy.

At one time it could plausibly be argued that a first-use policy did serve as a military deterrent. However, this was true only for that period of time in history when the United States had overwhelming nuclear superiority. Now it would be simply ridiculous, if it were not so dangerous to all mankind, to maintain this strategy. I find it impossible to believe that the United States would launch its nuclear weapons in the face of a conventional attack in Europe. The Americans know full well that once the missiles are launched in Europe there will appear off the coast not far out of New York on one side of North America, and outside of San Francisco on the other side, Soviet submarines with nuclear weapons. They will be launched and if there is destruction in Europe or beyond Europe in the Soviet Union as a result of missiles launched by

the United States, there will be equal destruction in the United States as a result of missiles coming from Soviet sources.

Surely, Mr. Speaker, this is the central reality that lies behind the open discussion, the open skepticism, the open debunking, of the first-use strategy currently maintained by NATO. Surely this strategy has one function only in the modern world now, and that is to serve as an excuse for spending even more money year after year on much more complex nuclear technology. Surely in the name of reason and the in the name of humanity it is time to call a halt to this kind of madness.

Since the Prime Minister began the debate abroad by making a few comments, I hope it is something that will be pursued, not only here in the House for the people of Canada, but also within the NATO councils themselves.

I come now to what I see as a logically related point for my final suggestion. This concerns Canada's decision on the Cruise missile test. Nothing better illustrates our potential for illogical folly, on the one hand, or confident consistency on the other, than does our approach to the Cruise.

● (1240)

In commencing my comments on the Cruise missile, I want to clear up a bit of history. No fewer than three Cabinet Ministers have said from time to time that the decision reached by the Government of Canada on the Cruise was related to a NATO commitment. This, Mr. Speaker, is false.

The decision to deploy missiles in Europe, the so-called two-track policy, was reached on December 12, 1979. This decision included the decision to deploy Pershing missiles and ground-launched Cruise missiles. Nothing was said about air-launched Cruise missiles. The decision reached by the Government of Canada concerned not missiles in Europe, not a ground-launched Cruise missile, but a missile to be developed in the northern part of our own land, to be used by Strategic Air Command bombers and launched from the air. They are two different kinds of missiles.

The purpose of the testing of these missiles, I repeat, is to provide a technically operational foundation for buttressing the United States strategic deterrent. This strategic deterrent strategy was described by the Prime Minister as being a form of scare tactic which is the logic of another age. The Prime Minister, who loves logical games, cannot have it both ways. He cannot, on the one hand, be openly calling into question an outmoded deterrent strategy which he says belongs to the logic of another age, and at the same time head a Government which makes a decision about the development of a missile that is part and parcel of that same outmoded strategy.

I ask the Prime Minister to get serious about an important, concrete decision which could lend credibility to all that he has been doing in recent months. In my view, unless the Government gets serious and follows the path of its own logic, it can be appropriately dismissed by others.

As the House knows, the Government is committed to test the Cruise probably some time next month. It also knows that