

was afraid to face that question. He spoke strongly, he spoke shrilly. He used the same expressions that he used back in 1957 and 1958, the same decayed platitudes, the same single concern, the same cry for office. Mr. Speaker, the closer that Bob Winters looms, the louder speaks the Leader of the Opposition.

At the end of all these generalities the mountain brought forth a mouse. The amendment simply states that for various reasons the government does not have the confidence of the Canadian people. There is not a single definite challenge. He did not dare challenge on the question of nuclear arms. He was afraid. The hon. member for Trinity says "We have a leader who speaks with such directness; we have a leader who speaks with authority and definiteness". A few weeks ago his leader was saying "No nuclear arms under any circumstances".

He cried out against the government's defence policy and generalities. He referred to some of the general problems facing our country. He turned, he contradicted, he did violence to logic, and when he concluded he produced an amendment which he believed would have the effect of securing the support of other members of this house.

I am going to refer to one or two matters today. I am going to deal first with the general situation in so far as defence is concerned, and in order that there will be no misunderstanding I will simplify what I said previously, underlining in every particular what I said on that occasion. Before I do so I think I should read in part an editorial in the *Winnipeg Tribune* which deals with this matter. It refers to the campaign that has been going on which has so many forms, the campaign which brings known nuclear advocates to Canada to brainwash the public, that encourages various people to become captive audiences. There was the farewell visit of General Norstad, and then there were other statements that were made by other generals. I think it was Clemenceau who once said that "the business of defence is too serious for generals. It requires civilian control."

The editorial in the *Tribune* goes on to say with respect to what happened following the declaration that I made in 1959:

In the intervening period the whole military strategic and tactical situation has changed. But the military men and their spokesmen, just because they have the carriers they asked for four years ago, are now trying to pressure the dominion government into the ultimate decision in military planning. They think they must go the last mile—

Then there are some words in between, and we find this:

—regardless of public or political opinion on this fateful question.

Then I should like to refer to what I said on January 25 when I outlined the policy

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agreed upon by this cabinet. I am going to read this and then I am going to summarize it. I quote from page 3136 of *Hansard* for January 25, 1963:

Following SACEUR's recommendation, as we saw the situation in 1959 and as I said earlier in my remarks, we undertook to equip our squadrons assigned to NATO for a strike reconnaissance role, which role would include the mission of delivering nuclear weapons.

This was the basis, and every man and woman in this parliament knew that course was undertaken and understood. A program was approved and appropriated by parliament. The second point was, and I quote:

Delivery of the F-104G has commenced, but the strike reconnaissance role has been placed under doubt by the recent Nassau declaration concerning nuclear arms, as well as other developments both technical and political in the defence field.

Well, I could pick up almost any newspaper in either the United States or Canada and indicate that that was the interpretation given, those were the views of the conclusions arrived at there when the two leaders got together. I have before me the *Christian Science Monitor*. This represents a completely changed viewpoint. I quote:

The United States wants its principal allies to submerge their own national defence in a collective defence, where for example, General de Gaulle would merely be one among many and lose direct control of French defence. In present circumstances this unified defence quite simply means final control by the United States.

These are not the views of any Canadian newspaper; this is a statement made by a reputable newspaper whose editorials are quoted everywhere.

The allies do not like it. This is partly because they do not want to yield up control of their own nuclear destiny—a sacrifice they know the United States is not prepared to make. And partly because they have strong ban the bomb minorities who fear that American control in a crisis means control by the Pentagon, by men trained to think in terms of war, not peace.

Mr. Hellyer: Will the Prime Minister permit a question?

Some hon. Members: Sit down.

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Some hon. Members: Sit down.

Mr. Diefenbaker: Then again, in the same issue this appears under "Allied defence", and it sets out the change in United States strategy in this regard.

Mr. Hellyer: You are referring to strategic weapons, not tactical.

Mr. Diefenbaker: I come back to my statement which appeared in *Hansard* of January 25, and I quote: