SDI would lead to a new and expanded arms race.

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The history of the arms race demonstrated that new weapons developed by one superpower are soon copied by the other. Thus, U.S. research on strategic defence would likely spur the U.S.S.R. to equivalent testing and research.

Development of strategic defence systems would increase the chance of nuclear war.

This was the heart of the argument that SDI is destabilizing. The spectre of ballistic missile defence raises, for the first time in the modern nuclear era, the possibility of a "survivable" nuclear war and a nuclear war fighting capability. Present strategic doctrine dictates that a nuclear attack by one superpower is met with a destructive counter-strike by the other. This mutual assured destruction, which has prevented nuclear war over the years, is enshrined in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. SDI would put the U.S. on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, which stipulates that each party (the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, airbased, space-based or mobile land-based.

If successfully deployed, strategic defences would be destabilizing. Would U.S. and Soviet security be enhanced if both were invulnerable to nuclear attack? The answer, if we assume that defences would remain impenetrable, is probably yes. However, we do not live in a static world and consequently must consider the probability of changes to either superpower's offensive forces which would reduce the other's security.

There was little doubt that Canada, situated directly between the superpowers, would be required to participate in strategic defences, Mr. Watt said. Development of space-based