In the discussion of the situation in Southeast Asia — and there was very considerable discussion about it — there was naturally a great deal of thought about the position of Communist China, which is such a tremendous factor in this whole matter. The view was expressed by the leaders of certain Commonwealth countries — and it was expressed without qualification — that the policy of the countries of the West, including Canada if you like, in refusing to extend diplomatic recognition to Communist China was unrealistic and unhelpful, and that it did not assist in reaching a solution to the problems of Southeast Asia, which in this view, and I might add in the general view, could not be solved without the participation of the Government of Communist China.

Those who held this view without any qualification stated that the policy that had been adopted by certain governments was sterile and fruitless, and that the sooner that policy was abandoned and the sooner Communist China was admitted to the United Nations, the better it would be for the solution of outstanding international disputes. This did not imply, on the part of those who held the view, any particular sympathy with the form of government in Peking or with the aggressive policy that China has followed; it reflected, rather, the opinion that the Chinese Government should be in the world forum, where it would have to defend its actions and be subject to the pressures of world opinion.

I understand there was a reflection and a report of these discussions carried by a Canadian newspaper, which said that I had said in the discussions that China -- and these were the words used -- ought to have its place in the United Nations. I did speak along those lines, but that particular report does not reflect what I was attempting to put forward at the meeting. I agreed that conditions should be such that the Government of mainland China should be in the United Nations; but I pointed out to those who held this view without qualification that for many years Communist China was an aggressor in Korea, which was an obstacle to this kind of recognition and admission, and at the present time there is another and important obstacle to this recognition and admission - this formal admission - to the United Nations in that there are many governments, including our own, that could not accept the extension of Communist rule from mainland China to Formosa without the approval and consent of the people of that island, and until that difficulty in some form was removed it was not going to be easy to recognize the right of a government in Peking to be the Government of China in the United Nations and extend its authority over the island of Formosa.

Malaysia and Indonesia

of

ve

tha

rha:

exte

d A

he

lik: tha:

ngh

n th

, to

ight

to:

ard t

ship

t and

, K

wpoir

infor

alth

impor

urse

Var:

the

ment

t st

irst

affat tent

seri¢

ovide!

WOIT

reen:

L affi

Sovie

unts.

ntles

сопре 【

The meeting of the prime ministers received a very full report from the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, on the difficulty between Malaysia and Indonesia and the efforts his country had made to end the fighting, through discussion with the Government of Indonesia and other governments. In that connection — and I think this is a very useful paragraph in the communiqué—the prime ministers expressed not only their hope for an early termination of a totally unnecessary contest forced on Malaysia by a larger country but gave their support to the Prime Minister and the Government and people of Malaysia in their effort to pressure and maintain their own independence against that kind of pressure. This was subscribed to by all 18 members of the Conference. We will