

principles and purposes of the Charter. As has already been said, why should we be asked to pool our security with a nation which will not, and is determined not to, reveal to the world what it is doing?

I suggest with deference that if the factors contributing to the present state of tension and insecurity were objectively examined, it would be found that the principal aggravating causes are:

1. The tremendous size of the armed forces maintained and deployed by the Soviet Union, particularly in Europe;

2. The failure of the Soviet Union to co-operate in the establishment of collective forces under the United Nations on the basis of Article 43 of the Charter;

3. The failure of the Soviet Union to co-operate in the development of proposals to establish international control of atomic energy, and

4. The failure of the Soviet Union to respond to the majority view expressed in the Commission on conventional armaments that measures must be taken to strengthen the sense of security of nations before national armaments may be regulated or reduced. A glance at the Soviet resolution reveals how essentially meaningless it is. The resolution seeks to persuade us that it favours disarmament, but what does it propose in the way of enforcement? I quote the final paragraph of the Soviet draft resolution:

"The General Assembly recommends to establish within the framework of the Security Council an international control body for the purpose of supervision of, and control over, the implementation of the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and for the prohibition of atomic weapons." In appearance, this may sound reassuring, but in fact what does it mean? It means that an international body -- whose activities are not even outlined -- is to be established "within the framework of the Security Council." That can only mean that the veto is to apply at some stage and can be used to prevent the inspection and enforcement that is so essential to a disarmament agreement. As has already been asked in this debate, what opportunity is there for inspection, for verification and for control. The Soviet proposals about international control over the implementation of measures of disarmament are, to say the least, ambiguous. In the view of the Canadian delegation, a system of international inspection is essential to any disarmament agreement. It is one thing for the Soviet Union to say that they will reduce by one-third their present land, naval and air forces, and even to say after a year has passed that the one-third reduction has been carried out, but it is quite another thing for the Soviet Union to tell us that they will welcome international observers before, during and after the reduction. There, I submit with deference, lies the weakness of the proposal. In the first case, the world has to accept the unsupported assurances of the Soviet Government. In the second case, the world can satisfy itself as to the manner in which disarmament is being carried out. This international inspection would, of course, apply to every country and there would be no invidious singling out of any one country for inspection. A constant scrutiny would be kept on the progress of disarmament measures.

In the view of our delegation, there is nothing more important in this whole problem of international disarmament than the question of inspection, verification and control. The Soviet delegate has already been asked to declare unequivocally whether his country is prepared to open its doors and its borders to international observer teams. Such observer teams might establish both quantitatively and qualitatively the armed forces and armaments, both existing and potential, at the disposal of the Soviet Union in its own territories and the territories under its control, as

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