

lies not just in its frightful devastation, but in its inherent unpredictability and freedom from true strategic control by the governments involved. While nobody knows what objectives justify nuclear use other than retaliation against nuclear weapons or against strikes upon them, a government that did not so reply to a nuclear attack would fall. That war would then become an uncontrollable total war fought for objectives far transcending the supposedly limited means and objectives that the United States professes to employ.”<sup>110</sup>

It is evident that responses to the RMA, by the West and by potential WMD proliferators, will complicate existing arms control measures. However, this situation should not be considered the death knell of arms control. Indeed, there may well be reasons to expect renewed emphasis on controlling WMD in the new strategic environment of the RMA. As summarized in Table 2, the existing arms control regimes will still be relevant although not always effective in all circumstances. That RMA-related technologies will not likely be subjected to arms control efforts, will upset some countries, but this will not bring a halt to efforts to control WMDs. Moreover, as noted above, the United States, for its own self-interest, is pressing for tighter controls on WMD and adopting counter-proliferation policies in the expectation that some states will use the RMA as a reason to ignore or challenge existing multilateral arms control regimes.

To argue that the advent of the RMA has the potential to encourage the proliferation of WMDs and thus create difficulties for future arms control and associated verification efforts, does not mean that this will necessarily take place. A key factor will be the relationship between individual states and neighboring countries as well non-regional states which for varying reasons may become adversaries and threaten intervention. A region of relative intra-state stability which provides no reason for intervention by major outside powers may be unaffected by any adverse effects of the RMA. Latin America may be considered in this category.

As discussed above, the real focus for concern about the impact of the RMA is with the relatively small number of so-called rogue states which are viewed by the United States, and depending on the region or country, by U.S. allies and others, as presenting a threat to their neighbors and to broader international stability. The view is that existing judicial and political arms control methods may be insufficient. It is the expectation that force may be needed to check these states that has driven much of the RMA in the United States. But it is these states which are crucial for the integrity of future arms control efforts. If the RMA should make those efforts more difficult, then the fact that proliferation is not taking place more widely may be of little significance.

### **THREE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC AND ARMS CONTROL SCENARIOS**

One way of looking at the implications of the RMA on arms control is to examine three broad categories of states that the United States may face: 1) a state with significant conventional capabilities, limited RMA capacity, but an advanced WMD capability; 2) a state with less

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<sup>110</sup> Blank, “The Illusion of A Short-War,” p. 144.