

international divides, and its tradition as a conflict-resolver and problem-solver mean it could devote its efforts to ensuring:

- that participants in multilateral arrangements to constrain conventional proliferation (such as the OSCE or New Forum) do not work at cross purposes;
- that new partnerships and coalitions (such as in the Core Group or the MTCR) break down the barriers between suppliers and recipients of weapons technologies;
- that efforts to constrain conventional proliferation are conceived against the backdrop of a broader conception of security that takes account of its human as well as state-centered dimension.

Of course, Canada's position as a minor player in the global arms trade means that by itself, it cannot "solve" any of the problems of conventional proliferation. Further, its minor role means that high-profile or significant restraint initiatives that affect the interests of major suppliers much more than they affect Canada will not be considered credible within the international community.

Canada can pride itself on a relatively restrictive arms export control policy. It has not been amended since 1986, however, and many global changes and shifts in emphasis in Canadian foreign policy suggest that the policy could be updated and made consistent with the broad thrust of Canadian foreign policy.

Measures that could be taken include:

- shifting the emphasis from *restricted* to *directed* trade, which could shift the "burden of proof" that a given sale would enhance security to proponents rather than opponents of a sale. This might require identifying those states to which Canada is willing to sell military goods (much like the Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCCL)), and perhaps also a sort of "impact assessment";
- amending the 1986 arms export guidelines to include respect for and protection of human rights without the existing conditional loophole ("unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population");
- adding criteria such as reporting to the UN Arms Register, participating in regional security forums, or having a democratic regime in which civilian institutions control the armed forces and military spending.

The potential costs and benefits of these possible changes are discussed in chapter seven.

Options for Constraining Conventional Proliferation

Many measures to constrain conventional proliferation are currently being pursued unilaterally and multilaterally, at the official and non-governmental level. These include changes to national export control systems, enhancement or creation of new multilateral supplier regimes, development of regional measures that address the demand-side of the equation, and global measures that concentrate on transparency and information-gathering issues. There are a number of weaknesses in existing measures in all of these areas that can and should be redressed.

Canada can contribute to these efforts by keeping the promotion of constraints on conventional proliferation a high-profile item on its foreign policy agenda, and by selectively pursuing specific initiatives that take advantage of Canada's international position and comparative advantages. In addition to unilateral changes to its arms export control policy, Canada could (either alone or in tandem with other like-minded states), pursue several or all of the following initiatives to constrain conventional proliferation. Each addresses an area in which existing measures are weak or non-existent, and focuses on