

that there were serious reservations about giving an IVO linked to the United Nations any powers for monitoring global military affairs outside the legal and political context of treaty specified arms control and disarmament measures.

Toward the end of the 1960s and during the 1970s, the focus of arms control and disarmament discussions shifted away from GCD towards the negotiation of specific, more narrowly focussed, agreements. For the most part discussions on verification reflected this shift and similarly focussed on provisions and mechanisms that concentrated on the precise purposes of specific treaties. Some suggestions for a broader IVO continued to be made, however, such as that by France in 1978 for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency.³

Paralleling these proposals for a comprehensive IVO linked to the United Nations were others representing a more evolutionary approach to the role of the United Nations in verification. The Netherlands, for example, put forward a proposal in 1978 and in 1982, during the First and Second Special Sessions on Disarmament, which was intended to streamline consultations and implement verification measures in a staged approach as the number of complex multilateral arms control treaties increased.⁴ The proposed IVO was to be linked with the United Nations and develop incrementally, at first being entrusted only with the verification of a chemical weapon (CW) treaty. However, it was envisaged that such an agency would take on the verification of other future agreements as well, as the need arose.

Several comparable proposals for an IVO were put forward on the occasion of the Second Special Session on Disarmament in 1982.⁵ It was still the expectation that, over time, an IVO that was initially treaty-specific would serve as a stepping-stone toward the creation of a more general IVO with broader responsibilities.

During the period from the late 1960s to the 1980s, there were other developments which gave concrete expression to the concept of multilateral verification. The International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards systems, for example, provides a key model of an international mechanism for verification in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, among other agreements. The current negotiations respecting the verification of a chemical weapons convention also illustrate the recognition that international verification is an important component in verifying multilateral agreements.