

Charter clearly envisaged the maintenance of peace and security essentially as a task of the Security Council acting collectively in the achievement of a common purpose.

Expectations were rapidly dispelled by the cold war, the assertion of the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and, in 1950, the war in Korea. The Soviet Union resorted to constant use of the veto and Chapter VII became in effect a dead-letter.

Balked by great power differences from proceeding along the path preferred by the San Francisco drafters, the members of the Organization, acting collectively, gradually encouraged, devised and eventually demanded the development of new techniques based on the generalities and the permissive language of Chapter VI. Acting on some occasions through the Security Council, on others through the Secretary-General, and on still others through General Assembly resolutions, the membership established United Nations commissions, watch-dog committees, supervisory bodies for truces and cease-fires, observation groups, special missions and special representatives of the Secretary-General. On a still larger scale were the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEF), the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), and the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). For nearly 20 years, this process of "perfecting in the crucible of experience" was at work. The Charter was not changed by so much as a comma, but unquestionably, so far as most member states are concerned, it was interpreted in a very different sense. Inevitably, the states whose special authority was being circumvented by the new interpretation, and against whose wishes the *ad hoc* peace-keeping decisions were taken, were bound to protest, to oppose and to dissociate themselves from the new machinery of collective action. The dispute took on financial form when the majority of members agreed not only to launch a full-scale peace-keeping operation involving the use of military forces but to assess the entire membership for its cost.

Origins of the Financial Dispute

Attempting to overcome the deficiencies of the League, the drafters of the United Nations Charter stipulated in Article 19 that :

A member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years.

The article went on to provide that the General Assembly might permit such a member to vote if satisfied that failure to pay was due to conditions beyond