

The common law lawyers might not object to the reversal of their notions upon the subject of real estate, but they would certainly be entitled to complain of a statute which says that lands are not real estate, and then immediately provides that a husband may convey his real estate to his wife. What *is* covered by the words? Blackstone has nothing on the subject, and there is no explanatory note in the Act.

So far as we can judge from a hasty perusal, the other portions of the Act—those specially applicable to the new system of registration are reasonably clear. Some exceptions to this statement must be made. Sections 104 and 106, for example, are in conflict with one another, and the pivot section of the whole Act, 62, is a wonderful jumble. It would also have much facilitated a mastery of the statute if the effect of a certificate of title were all stated at one place instead of being scattered through the Act. For instance, by section 61 the certificate is stated to be subject to a number of minor matters that might form an objection to the title—taxes, easements, short leases &c; but no one would have any idea until the end of the Act was reached that possibly the certificate might be worth nothing at all. Under the heading "Miscellaneous Provisions," (sec 127), it is provided that every certificate "shall be void as against the title of any person adversely in actual occupation of, and rightfully entitled to, such land or any part thereof, at the time when such land was so brought under the provisions of this Act." This section deprives the Act of much of its benefit. Why all hidden difficulties may be obviated by a certificate, and such a palpable thing as possession not be a subject of settlement by the Examiner of Titles is not very apparent.

On the whole we are prepared to welcome the new system, and to give it a fair trial.

The officers appointed are as follows :—Registrar-General, James A. Miller, Q. C.; Examiner of Titles, Felix Chenier; and Accountant, E. H. Coleman.