

originating energy and as causing modifications in its environment with a purpose or end of its own, namely, the assimilation of matter into its own form. We look upon the animal as originating a power, and at the same time as reflecting upon itself, or feeling its own unity, in this action. Man reflects in a deeper sense upon this origination of force, and possesses abstract intellect.

It is possible, of course, for a person to say that even the inorganic, the stone, the water, the air, possesses in some degree self-determination. I should be glad to admit that there is nothing in time and space that lacks entirely self-determination. But the amount of self-determination is so small in what we term "the inorganic" as to escape ordinary observation.

While the plant manifests self-determination it does not manifest a consciousness of it. But the animal seems to approximate self-consciousness so far as to have a self feeling in its action. Man may be said to have that degree of consciousness of his personality which makes him a responsible will. I have no quarrel with the followers of Schopenhauer, who recognize self-determination in the plant and animal as will power. But, of course, a responsible or moral will is a wide step of advance beyond the self-determination of the mere animal or the mere plant.

Recognizing the existence of beings which can originate changes of form and bring into being what is essentially new, we are now prepared to understand the transcendence of the will. In the inorganic, the individual being has no transcendental activity, because its energy is all borrowed; because it originates nothing or adds nothing to the forces which it transmits. In the plant or the animal or the man, the self-activity adds new forms of determinations, and in so far as it does this it is transcendental;

it alone is responsible for the addition, whatever it is.

Transcendental therefore every will and every act of self-determination must be, because it adds a new determination to its environment or to itself, independently of any force or impulse received from without—its action is not mere transmittal of force. Here we may discriminate two kinds of transcendental activity. There may be mere spontaneity, which is self-determination without conscious motives. Above spontaneity there is conscious volition demanding the intellectual action of grasping motives and the separate volitional action of realizing them. Spontaneity, however, as well as free volition, possesses a transcendental element; namely it originates modifications and does not simply transmit energy.

Turning our attention to conscious volition, we may now see that both the intellect and the will belong within the sphere of self-determination. The action of the intellect possesses always the character of a reaction against the objective being; the intellect refuses to accept a being such as it offers itself and insists on classifying it. The first act of sense perception is an act of classification. "This object is somebody, or some action of somebody, or some relation," etc. By such act of classification the intellect degrades, or subordinates the object before it and discounts its pretensions. By classifying it as an individual in a general class it assumes that it has been produced or has become through a general process, and at present it is an unstable and transitory state or condition of that general object. In the language of Plato, "The present object before me participates in a more general object," it is an are of a larger circle, it is a part of a larger totality.

It will be seen that this very act of