

Zimbabwe

of controlling 22,000 guerrillas in assembly points with a tiny (1500-strong) Commonwealth force alongside their own commanders, has been well documented. (Most fully by Professor Henry Wiseman of the University of Guelph in his book *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: the Politics of Transition*.) The crisis in military terms came a year later, when a beerhall brawl led to factional fighting within three battalions of the new national army, whose units were made up equally from ZANLA (Mugabe) and ZIPRA (Nkomo) guerrillas who had operated separately from Mozambique and Zambia.

Establishing order

After the three mutinous battalions were disbanded, the national army was more deliberately built up of four brigades, three of them trained by a British military mission and one by North Koreans. There are still setbacks: during April a large group of army defectors was roaming near the Zambezi escarpment and raiding communities for food. But the smooth integration of the four brigades, and the discipline they have in general shown, have amazed both foreign diplomats and most of Zimbabwe's 200,000 whites who feared the consequences of "freedom fighters" coming to power.

The integration of politicians is seemingly trickier than that of soldiers. Prime Minister Mugabe has had difficult times with both Ian Smith, who remains unreconciled to change, and with Joshua Nkomo who, as the senior nationalist leader, never fully accepted a lower rank in the coalition formed at independence. But by April 1982, the second anniversary of independence, Mugabe had shown his political skill by chipping important sections off the main blocks of Nkomo's ZAPU and Smith's Republican Front (RF). For, having dismissed Nkomo and two other ZAPU ministers in February, he promoted three ZAPU MPs to the Cabinet. And, having engineered a breakaway by nine of Smith's twenty-member caucus he brought two of these RF rebels into the government. One of them, Chris Anderson, formerly Smith's Justice Minister, has special responsibility for the public service; in particular, this bright lawyer will be busy maintaining the morale of white civil servants who remain in key posts. Meanwhile, Nkomo is now sixty-five and Smith who is sixty-three recede into the shadows.

Three great challenges

For the two-year-old government of Robert Mugabe the largest tasks ahead lie in the fields of land resettlement, rural health services and mass education. The three are mutually supportive, because hundreds of schools and clinics are needed in order to keep on the land young people healthy and skilled enough to increase its productivity. Yet these sectors compete for the larger slices of a limited budget.

The government is determined that the resettlement program — of buying large farms from white farmers and turning them into small holdings or cooperatives for the landless and unemployed — should not simply involve land redistribution but should significantly increase food production. This is certainly an attainable objective, for much of the 18 million hectares (46 million acres) that had been alienated to white farmers since the 1930s was under-used

and a farmer with a holding of 1200 hectares (3000 acres) might well concentrate on a tobacco crop covering no more than 35 hectares.

An increase in productivity among African farmers is also necessary, since Zimbabwe's population of 7.7 million is increasing at one of the fastest rates in the world — at least 3.4 percent a year, and the census in August will give more accurate figures. It is also crucial that redistribution does not, even temporarily, reduce to any extent the agricultural production in the "commercial sector" (the non-racial term applied to the former white block of 5500 farms), because even in 1980, when the maize crop from peasant areas had doubled under Mugabe's price incentives, four-fifths of the marketed crops was still being produced on these white farms.

The size of this undertaking in resettlement is immense, dwarfing, for example, the land purchase scheme of 1.5 million acres in Kenya's "white highlands," which Britain financed with a mere eighteen million pound loan in the mid-1960s. During the Lancaster House conference British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington made it clear that it was beyond Britain's capacity to fund resettlement in Zimbabwe but that Britain would join an international effort.

This was the origin of the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD), held in March 1981 to seek pledges of more than 1,223 million Zimbabwe dollars for rural development. (One Zimbabwe dollar equals roughly one-and-a-half Canadian dollars.)

By then the Zimbabwe government, with United Nations and other help, had completed the human resettlement of some 1.4 million refugees who had fled from the war in rural areas either to neighboring countries or to the cities. It had also produced a statement of economic policy — *Growth with Equity* — which reassuringly balanced egalitarian principles with talk of price stability and "dynamic efficiency"; and it provided impressive documentation about dryland and irrigated projects for the seventy delegations (from forty-five countries and many agencies) that took part in ZIMCORD. The conference was a remarkable success for Economic Planning Minister Bernard Chidzero, who raised in commitments more than his target figure. Canada's contribution at ZIMCORD was to pledge fifty million Canadian dollars, much of it in the provision of road-grading vehicles and in aerial and geophysical surveys.

The actual progress in land settlement has, however, been slow so far although it is starting to pick up speed. By April 1982 only 757,540 hectares had been acquired by the government at a cost of fifteen million Zimbabwe dollars. A senior official in the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, however, cited a figure of 162,000 families to be settled on nine million hectares during the period to July 1985. If land pressures are to be relieved in the former "tribal trust lands" in eastern and southeastern Zimbabwe, where ZANLA guerrillas found their strongest support because of land hunger, the scheme has probably to reach that vast size.

New agriculturalists

Quantity is only the first problem. A meticulous process of valuation and bargaining with white farmers on a "willing buyer, willing seller" basis has slowed down ac-