

light artillery and on a very narrow front. Small raiding parties might (with luck) pass our lines and reach the Canal's bank some fifteen miles west between the Bitter Lakes and Kantara, and, if not prevented or observed by patrols (the last not a very probable contingency in view of the strength with which we are now holding this line), could place camel-borne mines in the channel which might sink one or more ships and close the waterway. This seems to be about the limit of effective Turkish action, short of a successful sympathetic rising of the Egyptians themselves.

*Per contra*, it is easy for Powers which hold the sea to throw a force into Syria. The strip of practicable country between the coast and sheer desert is little more than a hundred miles wide at many points, and both the supplies and the retreat of the Syro-German army of Ma'an would be quickly at the mercy of a few thousand men with good artillery. Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo would be obvious main points to occupy, and with the coast controlled from the sea, Ottoman dominion in Syria, and probably in Arabia as well, would be at an end in a week. If Bedawins continued militant, their exclusion from Syrian and Lower Mesopotamian markets would soon bring them to heel. Even their thin life cannot go on without certain necessities and luxuries, which Arabian oases do not supply. The settled folk, even in the towns, would give little or no trouble, and considerable elements might be expected to greet a French or British expeditionary force with ebullient enthusiasm destined to cool after some years' experience of even-handed western justice, regularity in tax-collection, and sanitary prejudices.

In the rest of the Ottoman Empire what may or will happen in the event of the War being fought to a finish ?