In the case of *Reddick* v. *The Saugeen Mutual Insurance Company* (*Ib.* 506), we find that no less than nine pages are occupied with a statement of the pleadings and facts. Two pages at the utmost should surely have sufficed for all this, the facts being fully stated in the judgment of the court.

Then take the case of *Cameron* v. *Cameron* (*Ib.* 561). In this case the undisputed facts were that a conveyance had been made by the defendants to the plaintiffs, under a mutual misapprehension of the facts, and without any fraud or deceit practised by the defendants upon the plaintiffs. The only parts of the judgment necessary to report were those portions showing the law to be, that as long as contracts entered into under a mutual misapprehension of facts are executory, such contracts cannot be enforced, even in the absence of fraud or deceit; but when the transaction is consummated, as in this case, by the execution and delivering of the conveyance, the parties must be left to their right as defined by the conveyance itself. It was well that the reported judgment should point out the difference between these two states of facts, referring in the one case to those cases that define the rights of the parties in the case of executory agreements and those cases which define the rights of the parties where a conveyance has actually been delivered, but no other portions of the judgment are of any actual interest to the profession.

In England the reports of cases in the Court of Appeal are very much more numerous than the reports of cases in the Divisional Courts and before single judges. In this Province the reverse is the case. Of course cases that indicate judicial opinion in regard to statute law, even in the first instance, should be somewhat fully reported; but as cases of magnitude and doubtful law usually find their way to the Court of Appeal, it is obvious that many of them are needlessly reported in the lower courts. The reports of our Court of Appeal are too full, and much might be eliminated in the direction I have pointed out.

In short, I believe that too many cases are reported, and that the reports themselves are unduly long. The remedy for all this is in the hands of the profession, or rather of the Law Society which represents them.

No doubt it is much easier to give the judgment of the judges precisely as delivered, and to detail the facts, pleadings and arguments of counsel from the statement of the judge, or from the briefs of counsel, and thus avoid a good deal of the labour which a critical condensation and arrangement of the case, such as I have suggested, involves. But if the reports are to be made what they ought to be, this labour must not be shirked.

There are practical difficulties in the way of improvement in the lines indicated, but they should as far as possible be overcome. This can only be done by more time and thought being devoted to the reports, and by the help of the judges themselves. It may be that this increased responsibility cannot reasonably be expected to be assumed by the reporters at their present salaries; and we must remember that in England there are, we believe, two editors and some thirty reporters, but something should be done in the premises. At least let it be understood that the profession desire a more careful selection of the cases to be reported, and a freer hand in striking out unnecessary matter.

LEX.