In the final section of the paper I want to touch briefly on what this can mean, in practice, and what its implications might be for Australia in the medium to long term. Here, in particular, I return to an earlier theme, concerning the questions and issues left out of Australia's 'open regionalism' policy. Here, more specifically, I touch on what I consider to be perhaps the most dangerous and most silenced aspect of the Westphalian model in its Antipodean representation - its intrinsic connection to global and regional forces engaged in precisely the kind of authoritarian, anti-liberal and anti-democratic processes Australian foreign policy ostensibly seeks to counter.

The Westphalian Model and Australia (3) Towards 'Open Regionalism' or Repressive Closure?

My argument in this section of the paper is that Australia's 'cooperative security' and 'open regionalism' policy perspectives are neither conceptually nor empirically as adequate as they might be because of at least three assumptions they make in relation to an enhanced engagement with the Asia/Pacific region. The first, that an adequate understanding of the strategic and/or political culture of the peoples of the Asia/Pacific region can be gained by aggregating the views of the upper echelons of their military and Governmental sectors. The second that, in the post-Cold War era, notions of a global movement towards liberal-democracy and cultural homogenisation can be evaluated via the perspectives of state-sponsored epistemic communities and/or the narrowly conceived institutionalism of regional 'socialised' elites. The third, that patterns of global life embedded for three centuries or more in Western ideas, cultural norms and politico-economic structures will remain dominant in global society in the foreseeable future.

Any doubt that these are the prevailing assumptions within Governmental sectors is easily enough overcome by reference to almost any official pronouncement of recent years invoking Australia's new relationships with the region, or more precisely with the governing elites of the region, represented all too often as *the* voice, *the* face, the enduring presence of *the* region.⁵⁷ Similarly, and in relation to the neo-liberal orthodoxy among contributions to the debate over Australia and the International Political Economy (IPE) these are assumptions clearly evident in the analysis-cum-advocacy of those who invoke either an explicit free-trade line on Australia's global/regional future or who, more cautiously, place their faith in institutionalised

⁵⁷This is particularly so in Australia's relations with Indonesia. For this see G. Barker, "Australia Needs Tougher Line on Succession" in <u>The Australian Financial Review</u> August 6, 1996: and the discussion of Prime Minister Howard's speech at the opening of the Australia/Asia Centre on May 8, 1997, in P. Kelly, "The Asian Imperative" <u>The Weekend Australian</u>, May 10, 1997.