

worked out in time for the 2003 G-8 summit), should make for improved safety in the upgrading of the Federation's civil power reactors. More important for our purposes here, enhanced clubworthiness would be the meaning of joint action with G-8 and other participants in an international programme of disposition. Over time, an official desire to reinforce the symbolism of participation could do more for Russian receptivity to best practice than the prescriptions contained in a Multilateral Agreement. Similarly, over a period of years the staff of an MMC could make a significant difference as exemplars of quality assurance and enforcers of high standards of performance as well as process managers pure and simple. In sum, a strategy of sustained disposition will exploit opportunities for working relationships to serve as channels for the transfer of practices and values conducive to greater care in the civil nuclear power sector.

Second, a strategy will strive for long-term sustainability of disposition by imparting agency for nuclear safety and environmental protection to the programme. Aside from affirming that the instrument should be a nonprofit corporation operating in the public interest and staffed by individuals from the industry, only little needs to be added. In a sharp break with past practice in Russia and current practice elsewhere, the Corporation should have an open and friendly attitude to the regulator(s), to civil society, and to the NGO community in particular. Implicit in this statement is the transcultural theme that's already been discussed. Sustained disposition is not a matter of Russians being instructed by others or Russians doing it their own way. A Western-style nuclear management corporation that wants to succeed in unique Russian circumstances will have to do some learning itself. Western and Japanese nuclear industries and governments will need to be more responsive socially and environmentally than is ordinarily the case if a public service of disposition is to be rendered without serious mishap over a period of many years. They will have to do more than put up with the Russian equivalent of what's usually regarded as the opposition in their own countries. They will also have to collaborate actively with the opposition and moreover encourage Minatom to follow suit. Enculturation is therefore a two-way street. It enlarges agency for nuclear responsibility in donor and recipient alike.

As to reassurance, it's vital to a strategy which not only meets donor needs but assists the recipient in complying without being lessened. For the Federation this could be done principally by arranging for a handover of the technical functions of an international management entity as benchmarks were met in the performance of Russia's industry and the regulators. Whether done incrementally or at one go, a future handover of everything but financial responsibility for the programme should provide Moscow with the prospect of renewed control over its civil nuclear affairs, especially when the event could also be read as symbolizing increased Russian standing in a multinational club of nuclear responsibility. For the nuclear industry in Russian, reassurance should consist in having an international corporate and not an intergovernmental management agency to deal with in executing the Multilateral Agreement. But beyond what might be provided to government and industry, the real job of reassurance would be to convey a sense of widened prospects to civil society. In adopting an innovative attitude to NGO participation and the like, a strategy of reassurance would convey a determination to break with past practice. It would break with the perennial denial of civil society by government, with decades of grievous pollution by Russian's nuclear industry, and with anything similar in the plans of government and industry to import spent nuclear fuel. In short, if disposition is to succeed a strategy will be needed that addresses the apprehensions of a Russian public which could block the entire venture.