

ship. A man who may have been accustomed to ten hours' hard work a day in the field will not always be able to undergo the hardships of a soldier. At his work he may rest whenever he pleases; on the march he must move on until the time of rest comes on for the whole. And much more, such is the case with mechanics and other men not at all accustomed to outdoor work. Having gone through all this, however, for three years, it is reasonable to expect that he can do it again if called upon during the next six years of his life, especially if he has had occasion to try it again once or twice during his stay in the reserve.

The small numbers of stragglers and sick in the Prussian army has been favorably remarked upon in 1866 by all the testimony we have, and there is no doubt it will be the same in 1870 as soon as an impartial and cool judgment shall be passed about it.

VIII.—STANDING PREPARATIONS FOR MOBILIZATION.

The first preparation is thirty million thalers in cash in the treasury. Such at least was the amount in 1866 collected and set aside by law, not to be touched except for paying the first expenses of war. This money is used in payment for the horses which are taken from the country, for the establishment of the great depots of provisions, and other immediate expenses. Thirty millions don't go very far nowadays, but they are sufficient until Parliament can find the ways and means. Not the calling in of the men is the main thing, but of the horses. I am unable to state what the number required is now; but anybody who knows what numbers of animals are needed for transportation can easily imagine the importance of the article in a country where no mules are raised. The number of horses fit for military service is registered by a yearly census; and every part of the army knows wherefrom they get their share. Mixed boards in each circle, as soon as the order is out, receive, examine, appraise, and assort them according to the schedule, and off they go. The additional trooper horses all come from Eastern Prussia, Mecklenburg, and Hanover, the provinces which raise the best stock. Railroads assist materially nowadays to accelerate this business. Horse trains are the first flying about. The artillery have the hardest task; they have to break in the additional horses during the few days before the start, and to utilize every moment of leisure when the first move by rail is made. If, therefore, the possibility of war arises, the purchase of the necessary artillery horses is the first step to be taken. In 1866 the artillery got their horses all ready in March, when the first difficulties arose with Austria. This year the war came upon Germany like a thief in the night, the artillery must have had much trouble, though to break horses for artillery service which have been at the plough may not be so very difficult after all for men who are perfectly up to the business. There is no trouble about the horses for the train. Officers procure their increased number of mounts by private purchase, but receive assistance in money.

It need hardly be mentioned that the material of every description in every department is always ready. Clothing, accoutrements, arms for the field army and for the depot battalions, are in keeping of each battalion, which has its own war store. The colonel is responsible for their preservation. All regular issues in peace are made therefrom, being replaced at the same time. The amount of ammunition, carts, and first reserves in ammunition train (*Kriegschargirung*) is always ready at the nearest depot. The

stores for the Landwehr are in charge of the Landwehr battalion commander, and of a few men permanently detailed. The reserve of needle-guns is very great. No new musket is ever issued, except the arsenal has got 150 per cent. in reserve. Supposing the field army is to take the field with 300,000 infantry, 450,000 needle-guns are actually in reserve. Prussia has made no contracts for the fabrication of arms of any description since the outbreak of the present war, though the government armories have, of course, to a great extent stopped work on account of the workmen being in the field. Neither have any purchases of arms been made in foreign countries.

The easiest part of the business is to get the men. The order for each man is ready to the name and address and to the very signature of the Landwehr battalion commander, and nothing is to be inserted but the date when the man is to report. Official notice is given besides by the newspapers, to call the attention of temporary absentees. The orders are prearranged by districts and villages, so as to reduce the time of forwarding by rail, and messengers on horseback, to a minimum. All applications for getting excused are settled every year by the department recruiting board, previously mentioned. They are of various kinds: 1st. Persons whose services in their civil position are indispensable in the very moment of mobilization, such as locomotive engineers; 2nd. Persons disabled by chronic disease or accidents; 3rd. Persons who have become entitled to exemption under the law, as a farmer whose father has died and has left the son the only supporter of a family of younger children, etc. All these cases are acted upon from year to year by the board. At the moment of a mobilization no applications are entertained at all, except in very urgent cases arisen since the last session of the board; but their number is, by a regular routine of business, reduced to a minimum.

As the mobilisation of the whole army at once can become necessary only in a case of war with Austria, Russia or France, the first movements have been fixed, once for all, for the concentration of army corps on the respective frontiers; and it need not be said that the plan for the transportation by rail to a certain extent is ready at the headquarters of the general staff, to the very time-tables of the great railroad lines.

(To be continued.)

THE FALL OF PARIS.

HISTORICAL COMPARISONS.

(From the London Daily Telegraph)

In history the campaign which is now closing will be known as the war of the great capitulations. Sedan, Metz and Paris have each in succession eclipsed the magnitude of all previous military surrenders, and stamped the conflict of 1870 with a character absolutely of its own. Pavia, Ulm, Baylen, the humiliating disasters which stand out most prominently on the page of the world's record, seem but trifling in comparison with the huge catastrophes that have "huddled on the back" of unfortunate France. It is singular that, when one endeavors to find any parallel or precedent for the events of the present campaign, it is in the annals of France herself, of the military nation *par excellence*, that the search is easiest and most successful. Saint Louis, King John, and King Francis were all French Monarchs; so was Napoleon the First, whose double surrender to the allies, though not so strikingly

dramatic in mode, was altogether as real and effective as that of his nephew at Sedan. Again at Pavia and at Baylen it was French armies and French commanders that gave up their swords; the Convention of Cintra mistaken and absurdly lenient though it was, involved the practical submission of a whole French army to the victors of Nimera, and if the capitulation of Ulm stood, until the capitulation of Sedan, unrivalled in magnitude and thoroughness it was only one brilliant exception to the strange rule that condemns the French to set against the memory of their splendid military triumphs a roll of military disaster unparalleled in the experience of any other people. The 25,000 men whom Mack surrendered in October 1805—even the 80,000 men who composed the army that Napoleon then broke up in the Valley of the Danube—are hardly a patch upon the enormous masses of soldiery which, in this marvellous campaign, we have seen delivering themselves up captives to the inexorably skilful and fortunate invader. The 90,000 of Sedan, the 173,000 of Metz, the 17,000 of Strasbourg, the 14,000 of Orleans, the 22,000 of Le Mans, the almost innumerable thousands of defeated and dejected men who have been marched into captivity through the forced gates of Thionville, Verdun, and a score of other fortresses what are all these in relation to the tremendous surrender which is to-day in progress under our eyes? The capitulation of Paris is not the yielding of a fortress, not the submission of a garrison; it is the surrender of a nation. It would be difficult to discover, even in the chronicles of this unprecedented strife, clearer proof of the

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of the Germans than afforded by the facts and figures which relate to the surrender of Paris. The investing army which receives the submission of the huge garrison is even at this moment, after all the reinforcements from Germany, not half so numerous as the force that submits. The Prussian Guard, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and Twelfth North German Corps, the two Bavarian Corps of Von der Tann and Hartmann, and the division of Wurttembergers which holds the ground on the south-east of Paris, do not at highest calculation number more than 210,000 or 220,000 men. The Landwehr Divisions and other, so to speak, accidental forces that help to complete the circle of investment may perhaps raise the total to 250,000. But look for a moment at the conditions under which this force has had, during four weary winter months, to do its work. The front which the Germans have been compelled to show to the enemy has, even when the investment was closest, never been of smaller extent than some fifty miles. Within the circle, at the very heart of it, and able to move at will as one man in one mass to any point of the circumference, lay an army of 520,000 men—more than twice as strong as the beleaguering troops at the highest computation of their numbers. Again and again has the huge host within striven with lavish sacrifice of blood, to break through the bonds which, stretched around them so finely, yet held them in so firmly. Circular railway, "strategical" routes inside the ramparts, all the facilities of the interior lines and rapid communication, have availed nothing against the stern purpose and untiring vigilance of the besiegers. In unwearied patience and stolid self-devotion, with a watchfulness and fortitude which it would be hard to match even from the annals of Spartan trials and triumphs, have the Germans maintained their investment. Eye has never failed,