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and Durable Peace to make an independent study of postwar problems in the Far East. The group agreed upon the following measures:

1. "Return of Manchuria, Formosa and Pescadores to China; relinquishment of all territory seized since July, 1937, and control of all Pacific islands occupied since 1914.
2. Freeing of Korea, with assurance of help in attaining stable and efficient government.
3. Placing Japanese mandated islands under international supervision and not assigned as outright possessions to any one country.
4. Disarmament of Japan and dismantling of her war plants, not as unilateral action but as part of world program to reduce armament.
5. Punishment of Japanese war criminals, but that it be confined to those whose direct and personal responsibility for war crimes is established.
6. Period of military occupation of Japan should be brief and limited in scope."

In outlining its suggestions the group said that the world stood to gain from an economically stable and prosperous Japan, provided such a Japan was under the control not of a military clique but of leaders committed to a civilian government and international cooperation. It urged that in dismantling Japan's war plants the United Nations avoid crippling the basic peacetime industries essential to the livelihood of the people, and permit her to retain a merchant fleet sufficient for her needs in world trade.

The statement was signed by Luman J. Shafer, secretary for Japan and China of the Board of Foreign Missions, Reformed Church of America; Leland S. Albright, secretary, International Missionary Council; Raymond L. Archer, superintendent, Methodist Mission in Malaya; Eugene E. Barnett, general secretary, National Council of the Y.M.C.A.; M. Searle Bates, vice president, University of Nanking; John W. Decker, secretary, International Missionary Council; Wynne C. Fairfield, secretary, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions; Elmer K. Higdon, executive secretary, United Christian Missionary Society, Disciples of Christ; A. Kristian Jensen, Methodist missionary in Korea; Kenneth S. Latourette, professor at Yale University; Sarah S. Lyon, national board of the Y.M.C.A.; Joe J. Mickle, associate secretary, Foreign Missions Conference of North America; W. Plumer Mills, Presbyterian Mission, Nanking, China; Frank W. Price, professor, Nanking Theological Seminary, Chengtu, China, and A.K. Reischauer, formerly executive secretary, Woman's Christian College of Japan, now teaching at Union Theological Seminary.

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\*\*On May 25 the Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems released a summary (received too late for inclusion in Report No. 7) setting forth the views of 51 cooperating faculty groups who had been invited to express opinions concerning the postwar treatment of Japan.

With "only negligible exceptions" the groups agreed that postwar policy towards Japan "should envisage from the outset her reorientation and ultimate readmission in good standing to the community of nations." They accepted the point of view that a distinction must be made between the Japanese authorities who would be dealt with in arranging for unconditional surrender and those with whom the peace settlement would be concluded. It was agreed that the latter should "be representative of the democratic and peace-loving groups in Japan."

Most of the groups "confessed to considerable ignorance" as to the role of the Japanese Emperor and were content to say that decision as to his future, both as an institution and as an individual, should be determined by the answers to such questions as the following: To what extent is he a real stabilizing influence? To what extent is he a tool of unscrupulous governmental leaders? To what extent does his own view of ends and means coincide with those of such men as Premier Tojo? Of the groups that offered definite proposals, some favored Hirohito's abdication but the preservation of the dynasty. Others, in about equal numbers, would do away with the whole institution. Still others would keep Hirohito or Chichibu on the throne as a source of continuity or stability and would use him to appoint the leaders of the postwar government. Some would destroy the doctrine of his divinity, while others said that they would not