ish "three", would be a Canadian. In other words there would be a "panel" of British Empire representatives.

A similar procedure would be followed for the Munitions Assignments Board, both in Washington and London.

This arrangement by which Canadian representatives would become part of a British Commonwealth side of the Combined Boards would undoubtedly be the simplest and most easily worked of the possible alternatives. It is recommended by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff who add, however, the Proviso, "our representatives should act as representatives of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, through whom they would have the right of appeal to the Canadian Government in the event they consider that at any time Canada's needs are not being adequately met."

In theory, this dual position of Canadian representatives might seem to present difficulties. In practice, those difficulties should not be any greater than those which exist in the case of a Canadian Corps Commander in a British Army. General McNaughton takes his orders from General Brooke, but he can always appeal against those orders to Ottawa. There has been up to the present no trouble over this divided military responsibility.

A more serious objection possibly, is that Canadian representation through a "Commonwealth", or "U.K.-Canadian Staff" would make impossible our association with the U.S.A. in questions where our interests were closer to Washington than London. An assignments Board of three might often result in a U.S.-Canada vs U.K. line-up on certain issues. It will be difficult for the Canadian representative to take any such position if we are part of a Commonwealth representation.

The answer to this argument is, however, that we can make our own special position felt in the Commonwealth discussions prior to meetings of the Combined Boards; that only by associating ourselves with the British can we, indeed, be sure of participating in all these discussions.

In short, if we want to know what is going on, and give the maximum protection to our special interests, we should have Canadian representatives actually part of a British Joint Staff, rather than rely on separate consultation outside the U.K.-U.S. Boards, as outlined in the third alternative discussed below.

(c) The Third alternative would be the maintenance of an independent position outside the three Combined Boards but the provision in Washington and London of adequate liaison machinery for consultation with them whenever our interests are affected.

This is, in essence, the solution advanced by the United Kingdom for the London end of the Combined Boards. It could also be extended to cover the Washington end. It would, in fact, merely be an extension of the status quo; at least so far as our participation in the planning and conduct of the war is concerned.

Before December 7th, 1939 [1941?], there was no intention of setting up any special Joint U.K.-Canada Staff, Planning or Production Committees in London. It may be argued, therefore, that there is no reason now why we should