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THE JUDGE MAKER.

Hon. A. B. Aylesworth, K.C., as successor of Sir Wm. Mulock in the cabinet, will be the principal distributor of patronage for the province.

His recommendations will govern the appointment of judges for Ontario, also the promotion of judges. In view of these circumstances it is right that Mr. Aylesworth should be made a judge.

He goes into court supported by the prestige of a cabinet position, which makes him virtual master of the material interests of the judge before whom he pleads, and of the lawyer who opposes him.

Members of the legal profession and to their clients this is grossly unfair; to the judges it is temptation couched in a most insidious and dangerous form.

It is obvious that a judge's prospects of promotion should not be in the mercy of a lawyer who is practicing in court every day.

Our judges, and they should not be exposed to unnecessary temptation. The spectacle of Mr. Aylesworth, the judge-maker of Ontario, practicing before judges who may profit from his friendship or suffer from his enmity, is not a healthy one.

SIR WILFRID IS NOT MODEST. Sir Wilfrid Laurier has said many extraordinary things while under the influence of his own eloquence, but he fairly broke his record in a speech delivered the other day.

He said: "I have the dream of my life," he said, "to develop my country, to make life more happy for my fellow-countrymen. I have tried to make wealth for those who had it not, and more riches for those who had."

There is a grim truth in these utterances in so far as they apply to that exclusive circle of gentlemen who had little or nothing nine years ago and who to-day are numbered among the country's millionaires.

But if we understand Sir Wilfrid, he claims to include the masses in the sphere of these achievements—"I statesmanship which have made."

"Wealth for those who had it not and more riches for those who had."

Let us see what Sir Wilfrid has really done to justify these self-administered compliments.

Under the country's annual expenditure has been increased from forty millions to eighty millions. The per capita taxation has been materially increased.

Railways, hundreds of miles of them, have been built with the people's money and credit, yet those railways are owned by a few favored individuals, who exact from the public ruinous charges in freight, express and passenger rates.

A very moderate conception of duty to the ordinary everyday workingman would have caused Sir Wilfrid to keep in the people's possession railways which expenditure of money has paid for, railways which would serve them at moderate rates and honestly administered yield profits for the reduction of taxation.

Neither the railways nor any other monopoly has been made to yield an inch of ground under the pressure of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Monopoly under his administration has, on the other hand, grown in power and arrogance and it stands to-day in Canada as the greatest menace to the comfort of the Canadian home.

The "rich" about which Sir Wilfrid grows so eloquent speak in dividends and reserve funds of the great corporations of the country. They have multiplied at the expense of the people.

There are other things, very simple things, Sir Wilfrid Laurier could have done to enrich his fellow-countrymen. He could have raised the tone of public life by encouraging honest independent utterance in the national parliament, by bringing to his cabinet men of pronounced public sympathies, by discouraging the trickster and the manipulator and by aiding the efforts of individual members of the house of commons to legislate along the lines of public rights. He could have dignified the high offices which were within the gift of his government, by making them the prizes of men of ability and integrity. Capable high-minded judges, honest officials, courageous representatives in parliament and economical administrators of the public funds are worth more to the people than a dozen transcontinental railways built at the public expense and owned by private individuals.

The people do not require the fine arts of politics to make them happy. What they want more than anything else is blunt, straightforward honesty in its representatives, in parliament and in public offices, more public sympathy in its cabinets. Sir Wilfrid Laurier has deliberately set himself against the encouragement of these qualities, in public men and public officials. His appointments to high office have been carried out in brutal disregard

A TUBE RAILWAY UNDER PUBLIC OWNERSHIP IN TORONTO.

The Toronto street railway service is unsatisfactory and always will be unless it is identified with a large, well-organized and well-capitalized company.

As we have pointed out in The World time after time over one-quarter of the earnings of the Toronto Railway every day have to go to pay dividends on six millions of capital, not one dollar of which was ever put in the system.

Complaints which are made every day in unnecessary dividends would do us in the way of improved equipment, such as, for instance, the highest type of air brake, the highest type of car, the highest type of motor and fender.

It is saying that half the people that are killed in this city are killed because of poor equipment. True, some of the people who are killed are negligent, but even the negligent would be saved in many cases with better equipment.

Is there any cure for this condition of affairs? We know of nothing in the night like that of public ownership, as will be seen in the extract given below showing what public ownership has done and is doing in Germany.

Public ownership has worked wonders in Germany, where the cities are steadily acquiring and owning their street railways, while the cities are steadily making in view of substantial service to the public rather than the making of money for individuals. They have accordingly greatly improved their lines.

They have tackled the question of the distribution of railway concentrated population by means of a congested system. They are actually extending their lines so as to give poor people and working people a chance of getting to the crowded centres and owning little homes of their own some distance from the centre, but easily accessible by street car service.

Is there any street car system in America to-day that is working on these lines? We do not know of one except perhaps in Fort William. Poor Arthur and in the City of Guelph and perhaps two or three other cities.

Our view of the street railway problem in Toronto is that this city at the forthcoming session of the Ontario legislature should obtain power to create a public utilities commission, the details of which we will discuss hereafter, and to attempt to define what a public utilities commission should be.

Every kind of public utility, such as gas, water, electric power, street railways, and all other public utilities, should be placed under the control of a public utilities commission, which would be empowered to regulate the rates and to see that the service is of the highest quality.

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INSPECTOR OF INSURANCE ISSUES REPORT FOR 1904

The report of the provincial inspector of insurance, dealing with the transactions of 1904, was issued yesterday.

In the recapitulation of life and accident insurance four companies are dealt with. Their total amount of risks is \$6,647,715.43, divided as follows: Central Life, \$448,250; Equity Life, \$212,573; People's Life, \$2,628,642; and the Toronto Life, \$3,358,250.

The Toronto Life, \$3,358,250, or which \$123,520.52 was for management. The individual expenditures were as follows:

Total Management expenses, \$17,275.19; Equity Life, \$882.21; People's Life, \$45,850.99; Toronto Life, \$7,415.22; 70,985.16. The total incomes are:

Central Life, \$13,441.52; Equity Life, \$4,480.59; People's Life, \$7,164.66; Toronto Life, \$15,947.42.

Total, \$31,034.20. The receipts of thirteen mutual fire insurance companies in 1904 were \$1,023,283 and the expenditures \$1,972,696.53, of which \$346,206.69 was for management. The net amount of risk was \$162,847,278.35.

Seventy-two purely mutual fire companies had a total income of \$40,808.72 and a total expenditure of \$48,106.85, of which management cost \$7,315.96. The net amount of risk was \$162,847,278.35.

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AN OPEN LETTER

To A. C. Kilham, Esq., Chief Commissioner, Board of Railway Commissioners for Canada.

Sir—Regulation of the tolls imposed by the carrying companies for the foundation of the argument advanced for the creation of the board of railway commissioners. You have publicly admitted that your board, as at present constituted, is not competent to deal with the question of the tolls.

It is not competent to deal with the question of the tolls imposed by the carrying companies for the foundation of the argument advanced for the creation of the board of railway commissioners.

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