

speak of freedom in two senses: it means either (1) self-determination whether good or bad, (2) self-determination which is harmonious with the true nature of the self. The former is the *sine qua non* of freedom, and without it the latter is impossible. Just as error is possible only for a thinking subject, so moral evil is possible only for a willing subject. An action must be *mine* before it can be good or bad, and what is not *mine* has no moral quality. Freedom, in the latter sense, is the conformity of my action with what I truly or in idea am. Hence I may be free in the former sense and not in the latter. Now, it is this second sense of freedom which Kant mainly has in his mind when he maintains that freedom consists in "willing the moral law." The moral law is the ideal of what I 'ought' to be if I realize what is implied in the true conception of myself. This conception of self, as Kant rightly maintains, is the product of reason; but he adds that it is exclusive of desire, and this, as we have argued, is to make the self an abstraction. Hence moral freedom cannot consist in realizing an abstract self, but only in realizing that self which is desired because it is adequate to the true nature of the self. The process of moral life is therefore a continual transformation of the lower into the higher self; but it presupposes the free activity of the subject as its necessary condition. Moral slavery is none the less free action.

If the view here advocated is adopted, we can no longer say that the free subject is not an object of knowledge; for, while it cannot be characterized as one object among others, it is known as what it is, viz., as a self-determined subject. Even Green, who has done so much to establish a true theory of knowledge and of