

Oral Questions

only safeguards are those which the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources has just mentioned.

Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale): I understand that the President of the Privy Council did not say that there was provision for a bilateral agreement. Perhaps the hon. gentleman is confusing this with a subsequent situation when the tighter set of safeguards was adopted and announced to the House on December 20, 1974. This was one year later than the Argentine contract. There have, of course, been negotiations between Canada and Argentina with regard to the higher level of Canadian standards with respect to safeguards. My understanding is that the exchange of notes referred to by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, on which he was seeking the concurrence of the government of Argentina with a view to tabling in the House, was the result of further negotiations.

I further understand that those negotiations relating to additional safeguard requirements which Canada has stipulated at the moment are continuing, but that the final bilateral agreement has not been completed. So, of course, the obligation under the financial agreement and the continuance of the project have been delayed while this is being negotiated.

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

**SALE OF CANDU REACTOR TO ARGENTINA—INQUIRY
WHETHER NOTES ADDITIONAL TO THOSE OF SEPTEMBER 10
AND 12 HAVE BEEN EXCHANGED**

Hon. Robert L. Stanfield (Leader of the Opposition): To the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Speaker, has there been any exchange of notes between Canada and Argentina other than the communication from our ambassador to the ambassador of Argentina on September 10 and the communication from the Argentine minister of foreign affairs on September 12 which, in effect, amounted to the sort of assurance which Canada got from India when Canada sold India an atomic reactor?

Hon. Allan J. MacEachen (Secretary of State for External Affairs): The hon. gentleman has referred to an exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the government of the Republic of Argentina constituting an agreement concerning nuclear co-operation which was signed in that country on September 10, 1974. If he wishes, I will be happy to table that exchange of notes. I understand there is a further exchange of notes in the field of nuclear co-operation which has not yet been made public. It will be made public if I get the concurrence of the government of Argentina, which I am seeking. This exchange is part of the further negotiation of a bilateral agreement upon which we are now working with the Argentine government.

**SALE OF CANDU REACTOR TO ARGENTINA—REQUEST FOR
TABLING OF NOTES EXCHANGED**

Hon. Robert L. Stanfield (Leader of the Opposition): Would the Secretary of State table those documents, and, when he has received permission from Argentina, table

[Mr. Stanfield.]

the rest? Perhaps he could clear up some confusion which has been created, quite unintentionally I am sure, by the Acting Prime Minister and by the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources.

Hon. Allan J. MacEachen (Secretary of State for External Affairs): Yes, Mr. Speaker.

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ENERGY

**INSPECTION OF NUCLEAR REACTORS—GOVERNMENT
INTENTION TO RELY ON SERVICES OF INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY**

Mr. Allan Lawrence (Northumberland-Durham): Mr. Speaker, I have a supplementary question for the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources. Do I understand that the position of the government, stated correctly, is that we are putting all our inspection eggs in the basket of the IAEA, in spite of the fact that there is criticism throughout the world now, I believe, that that agency simply does not have enough experienced inspectors to do the job properly? Are we relying completely on their safeguards and inspection?

Hon. Donald S. Macdonald (Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources): Mr. Speaker, those are the procedures provided by the non-proliferation treaty, namely that rather than have bilateral or country to country inspections, the inspections should be carried out by the international agency which has the confidence and support of so many countries. It is for this reason that we have adopted the international inspectors for the purpose of carrying out the Canadian bilateral regime.

Mr. Lawrence: A supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. We believe, in other words, that the NPT is not strong enough. What I am specifically asking the minister is to give a guarantee, if he will, on behalf of the government that the government itself believes that the inspection procedures and the inspection personnel of IAEA will never again permit us to be in the sorry state of affairs that we have in respect of the Indian matter.

Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale): Mr. Speaker, the hon. gentleman misunderstands the situation totally. The Indian arrangement was entered into before the International Atomic Energy Agency was in existence and before the non-proliferation treaty. On that basis, there was no safeguards regime to be entered at the time that Canada and, may I add, the United States entered into the arrangement with India in this regard. So that any further negotiations or transactions that may be concluded, not only from now on but since the creation of the IAEA, are under a specific regime of safeguards.

The Canadian bilateral regime goes further than the non-proliferation treaty, which permits peaceful nuclear explosions. The Canadian safeguards do not permit the use of atomic energy technology, equipment or uranium for that purpose at all, so to that extent the bilateral safeguards of Canada are much stricter than under the NPT. The NPT is a system that is very much stricter than