

significant way; rather, like the London Report, it largely codified and tidied up practices and institutional procedures that had grown up over the previous eight years.

Much the same could be said of the replacement of EPC by the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht in 1991. In this case however, the symbolism of the language adopted reflected an attempt to make the CFSP more "communautaire" than EPC. To this end, the CFSP was made a distinct "pillar" of the structure of the Union. Member states (note the change from "High Contracting Parties"), committed themselves, in aspiration at least, to the development of "common" policies that in principle could cover all areas of foreign and security policy. This was in contrast to the simple commitment to policy "cooperation" that had characterized EPC. On the institutional side, the EPC Secretariat was absorbed into the Council Secretariat, and CFSP matters have become primarily a General Affairs Council responsibility instead of being handled by what formally had been separate meetings of foreign ministers. The Commission, along with member states, would now have the right to refer to the Council any question relating to the CFSP and submit proposals to it. Qualified majority voting became possible with respect to the implementation of joint action in support of agreed policies. With respect to the substance of common policies, it was agreed at Maastricht that upon ratification the CSCE (later the OSCE) process; European arms control; nuclear non-proliferation; economic aspects of security; transfers of military technology, and arms exports would be subject to the adoption of common policies.

Particularly problematic at Maastricht was the issue of including defence in the body of the Treaty. This, in turn, raised the question of the relationship of the WEU to the Union. A Declaration of WEU member states was annexed to the Treaty providing for greater consultation and coordination between the Council and the WEU. The WEU Council and Secretariat have been moved to Brussels, meetings have been synchronized, as has the rotation of presidencies. On more substantive matters, the convoluted language of the Treaty in the relevant articles of Title V reflects the difficulty of finding a formula acceptable to all twelve members at the time. Although the relationship of WEU to both the Union and NATO has evolved since Maastricht, many of the issues raised during the negotiation of the Treaty remain on the current agenda. Resolution of these issues is made difficult by the fact that not all members of the E.U. are members of NATO and not all the European allies are members of the E.U.. Above all, there remains the anomaly that WEU is developing some military responsibilities while defence remains outside the scope of the Union's authority. Defence ministers are not represented at meetings of the Council of Ministers.

In terms of policy outcomes, the record of EPC and the Common Foreign and Security Policy has been characterized more by the adoption of declaratory positions than of joint actions. Partly, this reflects the fact that the Union has few means of collective action available to it. More significantly, it reflects the reluctance of governments to delegate to the Union foreign policy responsibilities over sensitive areas of national interest. The intergovernmental character of EPC and CFSP, the restricted role of the Commission, and insistence upon national freedom of action, have meant that the Union does not have a common policy as much as a collection of coordinated national policies. Maastricht did, however, lead to a formal distinction between common