

7 March

In Dar es Salaam, the RPF and RG agreed to a **9 March** ceasefire and an agreement on "the withdrawal of foreign troops and their replacement by an international force organised under the aegis of the OAU and UN." The French again pushed for an interpositional UN force, but the US and others wanting the OAU to take the lead successfully stalled any UN decision.

12 March

French persistency and their repairing of relations with OAU and African SC members, allowed them to advance a very toned down **SC Res 812/93** asking the SG to do what he had already informally initiated, which was consult with the OAU regarding a joint Peace Keeping Operation (PKO). The SG wanted regional groups such as the OAU to take more regional leadership, but even the OAU argued that it lacked PKO experience and resources.

16 March

Peace talks started in Arusha between the RG and the RPF. There was some serious internal wrangling within the RG, inter alia the draft accord apportioned the MDR party the right to appoint the PM and they had appointed Nbenziyaremye. President Habyarimana whose party was the MRND opposed Nbenziyaremye, so invited another MDR member Agathe Uwilingiyimana to form the government. The MDR responded by revoking her membership in the party. This was ultimately settled by the compromise selection of Twagiramungu Faustin as PM.

2 April 1993

The French formally wrote to the SG asking for an immediate deployment of UNMOs on the Rwanda/Uganda border as the Arusha talks were deadlocked and they feared that hostilities were about to restart.

2-6 April

MGen. Baril led a Tech Mission to Rwanda and Uganda, and Col. Ross drafted the SG's report/recommendations for 100 UNMOs on Ugandan side.

Concurrently DPKO examined options if the Arusha talks were completed. If the UN were to supervise a ceasefire, identify cantonment points for integration and demobilization of both armies, organize and train the merged military and police, and observe an election, it was felt that they would need a Brigade Group of about 4500 and additional UN Civilian Police (CivPol).

20 May 1993

The SG's Interim Report on Rwanda (S/25810) asked the SC to authorize UNOMUR.

June 1993

The OAU had sent in a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) into Rwanda.

22 June

SC Res 846/93 15-0-0 created UNOMUR for 6 months initially, with a review every six months. It was pushed through by France with reluctant support by the US. Many SC members felt that UNOMUR would only be useful if it were part of a larger UN role within Rwanda. This larger role was perceived as hinging on the success of the Arusha peace talks.

28 June

RG refuses to sign the peace accord agreed to in Arusha. This was further indication of substantial divisions within the RG on issues such as the integration of the RPF into the military and the police.