

NATO political and military decisions, (3) turn Western Europe eastward, and (4) ultimately allow the Soviet Union to gain mastery not only in Europe but globally as well.⁴⁵ In Western Europe, the Conservative Government in Great Britain is most vehemently committed to these views, as are "Bavarian ultras," "West German revanchists," "aggressive NATO political and military circles," and so on. In addition, certain unspecified West European integrationists, while favouring the creation of a political and military union independent of the United States, have a similarly hostile attitude toward European détente.

Since a successful CSCE would exert an adverse influence on the European situation from the "Atlanticist" viewpoint, their tactics have been designed to delay the holding of a Conference as long as possible, and, once it proved unavoidable, to sabotage the gathering. Tactics of delay are to be seen especially in the American insistence on "prior conditions" such as successful four-power negotiations on Berlin, bilateral talks between the two Germanies, and, at one time, MBFR as well. The United States has also employed delaying tactics as a means of extracting concessions from the Soviet Union and its allies, and possibly even from its own allies as well in return for consent to move ahead.⁴⁶ As the CSCE became increasingly inevitable, however, "Atlanticist" tactics have shifted toward the prevention of a successful outcome. MBFR,