

process of arms control, the need for patience and diligence in negotiating agreements which are to stand the test of time and the importance of verification to ensure that agreements are honoured and generate confidence rather than suspicion. We must also recognize that, although our ultimate objective is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, we may have to live with and to rely on them for many years to come.

Canada can have an impact on nuclear weapons negotiations. We can make a contribution by improving political understanding between East and West through high level contacts with the Soviet and East European regimes and through the contacts which Canadians of all walks of life can have with their Soviet Bloc counterparts in trade, science, culture and sports. We can also contribute through our consultations with the Americans and other allies, bilaterally and in NATO. Finally, we can work with other like-minded countries to advance common security interests.

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Canada is welcome to offer sensible and imaginative proposals and technological expertise. In this endeavour, the Government must take the lead, but governments have no monopoly on ideas and there is an important role to be played by concerned Canadians. In addition to normal Parliamentary processes, special mechanisms exist for channeling ideas to the government, including the Ambassador for Disarmament's Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs. The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and private organizations also play important roles. The government's Disarmament Fund facilitates the process of public participation and involvement in the discussion of these issues, as well. Are further consultative mechanisms required?

Technology is important not only to weapons modernization but to arms control as well. Canadian seismological expertise has been applied to the problem of international verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, both here at home and through our participation in the Group of Seismic Experts in Geneva. In the same vein, we have examined the feasibility of developing a system for "space to space" surveillance which would permit the investigation of spacecraft that might be potential platforms for weapons. There may be other opportunities to assess the significance of space-based remote sensing techniques and proposals for the protection of satellites. Effectiveness in this area does not come cheaply but Canada is a technically advanced nation with suitable research capability. Budget permitting, should we make this technological support for arms control agreements a Canadian priority?

*The practicality and verifiability of declaratory measures need to be examined.*

Proposals have been made in various quarters that East and West jointly declare an intention not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, or that the two sides "freeze" their nuclear arsenals at current levels. In contemplating the utility of these proposals, considerations of practical value and verifiability should not be dismissed as inconsequential. The freeze proposal is as attractive in its conceptual simplicity as it is daunting in its practical complexity. It raises difficult and perhaps intractable problems of definition, scope and regional balances. Nor would declaring a freeze be sufficient; it would have to be verified to be useful. And negotiating a balanced and verifiable freeze could be as intricate and lengthy a process as the negotiation of weapons reductions. Nonetheless, the imperative of ensuring security at lower levels of nuclear weapons requires that no proposal or line of thinking on a possible solution be