

**Proceedings**

UNSSOD III commenced in grand style with higher-level representation than at either UNSSOD I in 1978 or UNSSOD II in 1982. Statements were delivered by UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, 23 Heads of State and Government and 55 Foreign Ministers, including the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark.

The Canadian Delegation, headed by Mr. Clark, included 15 Parliamentarians as observers and 20 non-government individuals as special advisers. Canada was one of only eight countries to include NGO representatives on its delegation. Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, acted as Deputy Head of the Delegation. Other Delegation members included Stephen Lewis, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York and de Montigny Marchand, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament and Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva.

The statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), delivered on June 13, placed major emphasis on recent concrete achievements in arms control and disarmament (ACD) and the need for UNSSOD III to complement and enhance that progress. Mr. Clark noted that the UN has an important role to play, but will only advance the ACD process if efforts are focussed on practical approaches and the issues capable of mustering consensus. Canadian ACD priorities include step-by-step progress toward the realization of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), negotiation of a convention banning chemical weapons, the achievement of deep reductions in nuclear-weapons arsenals, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the recognition of the central role of verification and confidence-building measures in the ACD process. In the latter regard, the SSEA drew specific attention to a joint Canada/Netherlands proposal for a UN Experts Study on a UN role in verification.

Recent progress in ACD in the USA/USSR context, especially the

ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement at the Moscow Summit, which concluded on June 2, was welcomed by virtually all speakers and had a pervasive and positive impact on the atmosphere of the Special Session. Nevertheless, some fundamental differences of approach became evident virtually from the outset.

The most significant areas of disagreement included: (a) the overall orientation — most Western states favoured a pragmatic, step-by-step approach to ACD issues, while some of the Non-Aligned, and to a lesser extent the Socialist states, preferred a more political, declaratory emphasis; (b) a general tendency among the Non-Aligned to place the onus for progress on the nuclear-weapon states, and the superpowers, in particular; and (c) different approaches to the role of the UN in the broad ACD process, with some countries seeking a broader UN role, and others placing more emphasis on negotiating efforts at the bilateral and regional levels.

These differences translated into significant disagreements on specific issues such as: whether the UNSSOD I Final Document of 1978 remained valid and should be reaffirmed in all its aspects, or whether it should rather be seen as a valued historical point of reference subject to modification in the light of new realities; the importance that should be attached to nuclear as opposed to conventional disarmament; the nature of the relationship between disarmament, development and security; the need to bring weapons-related research and development and the qualitative development of weapons under more effective policy direction; the utility of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace; support for the NPT; the pace and manner of progress toward the realization of a CTBT; and consideration of the naval arms race and prevention of an arms race in outer space issues.

Following the two-week Plenary debate, a Committee of the Whole (COW) was convened which established three working groups to consider the substantive agenda items, as follows:

**Working Group I**

- Review and appraisal of the present international situation

- Assessment of the decisions of UNSSOD I and II

**Working Group II**

- Assessment of developments and trends, including qualitative and quantitative aspects

**Working Group III**

- Disarmament machinery

- UN information and educational activities

In the week allowed for their work, none of the working groups succeeded in adopting agreed reports. Non-consensus "Chairman's Papers," together with lists of proposed amendments, were, however, forwarded to the COW Chairman to assist him in preparing a draft concluding document for the Special Session.

Following extensive consultations, the COW Chairman released his paper with only four days remaining. Despite some specific difficulties, Canada was generally pleased with its balanced and pragmatic tone. The COW did not meet again until the last day of the Special Session in an atmosphere of growing concern regarding the prospects for success. In the interim period, the Chairman held informal consultations with a group of selected countries (including Canada). Both during the informal consultations and in the COW, major areas of disagreement remained in the face of numerous and often conflicting proposed amendments.

When, by the evening of June 25, differences remained on numerous sections of the revised "Chairman's Paper," the Chairman adjourned the COW and called together a small group of "Friends of the Chair," including Canada, for further consultations. These continued until almost 3:00 a.m., June 26.

With the clock running out, it was clear to all participants that this informal meeting offered the last opportunity to salvage the Special Session. Despite the general fatigue, a sense of urgency and drama prevailed. The Chairman iden-