

ANNEX

Canadian Statements at the Stockholm Conference

Following is a selection of major statements made by members of the Canadian Delegation to the Stockholm Conference. These statements reflect Canada's positions on the various issues before the Conference.

Statement of January 25, 1984, on Verification

"Few would contest the proposition that the question of conventional arms in Europe must be approached from the premise that if the danger of conflict is to be lessened, a more stable balance of forces at the lowest level possible must be established between the two military alliances. The trend unfortunately has been in the other direction; not down, but upwards. The problem we are faced with today is how to assure States that their security can be maintained without increasing military potentials to an even more dangerous level, especially in central Europe. The key to this agonizing problem is to be found, I suggest, in the political intentions of governments and even more important in the degree of frankness and openness with which they make those intentions known. Mechanisms are needed which will lead to greater openness in military affairs among the participating States so that political intentions become easily discernible — and less readily misunderstood.

With these basic concerns in mind my Delegation joined a group of friends on January 24 in tabling a package of mutually complementary, confidence- and security-building measures which have been deliberately designed to reduce the risk of surprise attack, diminish the threat of armed conflict in Europe which could result from misunderstanding and miscalculation, and inhibit the use of force for the purpose of political intimidation. In other words, our proposal is aimed at increasing the

sense of security to a point where the tangible reduction of arms could become a policy option that might actually be chosen by the States concerned.

The proposals which we have co-sponsored are based on a mandate agreed at Madrid by participating States calling for measures which are militarily significant, applicable from the Atlantic to the Urals, politically binding and verifiable according to content. Taken together this set of interdependent measures would, if agreed to and implemented in good faith, take us a long step forward towards the creation of a new basis on which we could all approach the problem of actual arms reductions with confidence — and in the confident expectation that something might actually be achieved. Canada regards the challenge as urgent.

Canada believes that the provisions for confidence-building measures in the Final Act were a novel and ambitious

beginning. But we also learned after almost nine years' experience that those measures are not adequate to confirm the intentions of some governments. The fact that it has not been possible to verify whether States have, or have not, complied with these measures raises questions about motives and has demonstrated a major flaw in the regime of CSBMs in the Final Act: they are voluntary and they are not verifiable.

Based on this experience it is obvious that if CSBMs are to be significant, they have to be mandatory; they must be verifiable in including provisions for ensuring that any State participating in the system will permit action which would clarify doubts about compliance.

The precise mandate which has been given to us for the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is intended to overcome these deficiencies. We agreed on a mandate at Madrid which gives us a very precise compass by which to chart our course; if we follow it closely it will facilitate the development and application of measures that, in being militarily significant and verifiable, could carry us forward



Delegates to the Stockholm Conference during recent working group session. Seated at immediate left are members of Canadian Delegation to the Conference. Reportagebild