

other terms of the resolution of 2 November 1956. Whether the new functions we are suggesting require, in whole or in part, a new resolution of the Assembly is perhaps not very important now because such a resolution is before us, which is designed to remove any doubts on this score. In so far as is necessary, new arrangements will have to be worked out by agreement with Egypt and with Israel.

UNEF Can Be Effective

In this connexion, the scope and the nature of Egypt's earlier consent was brought up yesterday by the representative of Australia and referred to by more than one speaker this afternoon. On that point the Secretary-General made, I think, an important classification yesterday when he said: "To all the extent that movements of the United Nations Force are supposed to follow from the duties of the Force in relation to the cease-fire and withdrawal, the matter... has been regarded as non-controversial as it is covered by Egypt's general consent while, on the other hand, as regards activities of the United Nations Force which would extend beyond what is covered by this consent, an additional consent has been considered necessary".

The Secretary-General also said that whatever may be the legal situation under the Charter regarding consent, "in practice, the consent must obviously be qualified in such a way as to provide a reasonable basis for the operation of the United Nations Force".

I am satisfied myself that the United Nations Force, which has already operated effectively and non-controversially and has given us hope for the future role of the United Nations in the supervision of peace can, if it is given the opportunity and the authority, conduct these new peace supervision operations equally effectively. Absurd suspicions have been cast on this Force by the representative of the Soviet Union and by the representative of Bulgaria, I think it was, this afternoon; absurd suspicions were cast on this Force as an agency for the return of colonialism in a new form to this area. All I can say in this connexion is that the Force is under the control not of any one Power, either here in this Assembly or on the spot, but it is under the control of the United Nations and that it is a Force consisting of important elements from those well-known "colonial Powers" India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Finland.

When doubts about this Force are expressed by the countries of the Middle East, I accept the honesty of their doubts although I do not believe that they are justified. I can assure them that as far as our Delegation is concerned—and I am sure that it is true of practically all other delegations that have supported this Force—we have never at any

time conceived of this Force as anything which could remotely be called an occupation force. It is not a national army or a collection of national contingents; it is an emergency force from the United Nations composed of units from countries—the smaller countries—of diverse backgrounds and policies, which is not in a position to enforce its will on any country, nor has it the power to do so under the Charter if it so desired. As a member of our Delegation said last December in his statement in the General Assembly, the United Nations Emergency Force is not an instrument for enforcing a settlement but it can be an instrument to assist in establishing conditions in the area which would be of benefit to both the parties concerned and advantageous to peace and security.

Its peaceful purpose was to assist in the withdrawal of invading forces. We think it can also be used to assist in the maintenance of the Armistice on which both parties have agreed. And I do not see how this function of the United Nations Emergency Force could possibly be considered as one of occupation in any way, shape or form.

Let us not be confused and misled by semantics, either exaggerating or unduly limiting the value and the functions of this Force. Our United Nations Force is in being. It is operating effectively now under the blue flag of peace of the United Nations. It is no threat to the sovereignty of any nation and, whatever we may say here in debate, it expects—and I feel sure that it will receive—the co-operation of the peoples and the governments in the countries in which it operates for one purpose only: the prevention of conflict and the creation of an atmosphere which will make possible a peace settlement.

This Force can do a great new work for peace in the area if we give it the chance. I hope, in spite of the doubts that I have expressed about its ambiguous wording in one or two places and in spite of conflicting views about its meaning, that this draft resolution will give the United Nations and its Emergency Force that chance.

Such a hope will only be realized, however, if, first, Israeli forces are withdrawn and, secondly, if we back up the Secretary-General firmly and constructively in the task we are giving him, a task which I know he will undertake with the energy, sincerity and devotion he has already shown. If we do this, then we can be sure, I think, that the Secretary-General will use the authority we are now giving him and through the Force for peace which we have created ourselves, in a way which will bring about better conditions of security in the area than have existed in the troublous and unhappy past and thereby make an indispensable contribution to the peaceful and just political settlement which must come.

Later on the same day, the two resolutions were put to the vote. The first was approved by 74 votes in favour, (including Canada), to two opposed (France and Israel) with two abstentions (Luxembourg and the Netherlands).