

Buckinghamshire to Yorkshire; in a third the nomination to the Deanery of Worcester; in a fourth he says that, "if Adam, the architect, succeeds Worsley at the Board of Works, he shall think Chambers ill used."

"For the great affairs of state it is well known how substantially he insisted upon being the King *de facto* as well as *de jure*."

"That such a Sovereign was, for the servants he confided in, the best possible master, may well be supposed. He gave them his entire and hearty support. If he kept a watchful eye over all the proceedings both of parliament and the country; if we find him one day commenting on the line taken in debate as 'dangerous,' at another as 'timid and vacillating,' or discussing the composition of the majority, or its numbers upon the division, or suggesting that the journey of Mr. Fox to Paris should 'make the different departments bring on all their business before he comes back, as we shall have much less noise for the next three weeks;' or expressing his conviction that 'the Speaker's illness is feigned, and all to let the opposition have their pleasure at New-market;' he also asks, 'Who deserted you last night that you thought you had a right to count upon? Give me their names that I may mark my sense of their behaviour at the drawing-room to-morrow;' and again, 'if the utmost obsequiousness on my part, at the levee to-day, can gain over Mr. Solicitor General to your views, it shall not be wanting.' This was indeed efficiently supporting a favourite ministry; and when he had one forced upon him, his whole conduct was the reverse; all his countenance being given to their antagonists, until the moment arrived when he could safely throw them out."

"The first impression which such conduct makes is unfavorable to the monarch, and may at first sight give rise to an opinion that it was unconstitutional. But further reflection makes this somewhat doubtful. The question is 'Does the King of this country hold a real or only a nominal office? Is he merely a form, or is he a substantive power in our mixed and balanced constitution?' Some maintain, nay, it is a prevailing opinion among certain authorities of no mean rank, that the sovereign having chosen his ministers, assigns over to them the whole of the executive power.—They treat him as a kind of trustee for a temporary use, to preserve, as it were, some contingent estate; or a provisional assignee, to hold the property of an insolvent for a day, and then divest himself of the estate by assigning it over. They regard the only power really vested in the Crown to be the choice of ministers, and even the exercise of this to be controlled by the parliament. They reduce the King more completely to the condition of a state pageant or cypher than one of Abbe Sieyes's constitutions did, when he proposed to have a Grand Functionary with no power except to give away offices; upon which Napoleon, then first consul, to whom the proposition was tendered, asked if it well became him to be made a "Cochon a Pengrais a la

somme de trois millions par an? (a hog to be fattened at the rate of £120,000 a year.) The English animal, according to the above doctrine, much more nearly answers this somewhat coarse description; for the Abbe's plan was to give his royal beast a substantial voice in the distribution of all patronage; while our lion is only to have the sad prerogative of naming whosoever the parliament chooses, and eating his own mess in quiet."

"Now, with all the disposition in the world to desire that the Royal prerogative should be restricted, and the will of the nation govern the national affairs, we cannot comprehend this theory of a monarchy. It assigns to the Crown either far too much revenue, or far too little power. To pay a million a year, or more, for a name, seems absurdly extravagant. To affect living under a kingly government, and yet suffer no kind of kingly power, seems extravagantly absurd. Surely the meaning of having a sovereign is, that his voice should be heard and his influence felt in the administration of public affairs.—The different orders of the state have a right to look towards that high quarter all in their turn for support, when their rights are invaded by one another's encroachments, or to claim the royal umpirage when their mutual conflicts cannot be settled by mutual concessions; and unless the whole notion of a fixed monarchy, and a balance of three powers is a mere fiction and a dream, the royal portion of the composition must be allowed to have some power to produce some effect upon the quality of the whole. It is not denied that George III. sought to rule too much; it is not maintained that he had a right to be perpetually sacrificing all other considerations to the preservation and extension of his prerogative. But, that he only discharged the duty of his station by thinking for himself, according to his conscientious opinion, and using his influence for giving those opinions effect, cannot be denied unless those who, being averse to monarchy, and yet dreading a common-wealth, would incur all the cost, and all the far worse evils of a form of government which they think the worst, rather than seek for a better, and would purchase the continuance of the greatest evils at the highest price, rather than encounter the risk of change."

"George 3 set one example which is worthy of imitation in all times. He refused to be made a state puppet in his ministers' hands, and to let his name be used either by men whom he despised, or for purposes which he disapproved. Nor could any one ever accuse him of ruling by favorites; still less could any one, by pretending to be the people's choice, impose himself on his vigorous understanding."

#### NUMBER VII.

The sixth and seventh propositions are so intimately connected (the first of the latter being a corollary, or the converse of the former,) that I purpose to discuss them both in this number. They are as follows:

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