

lishing performance criteria and identifying available resources, the radically different conditions and requirements on each of Canada's three coasts, not to mention the various NATO areas. The list of tasks should be related as closely as possible to these realities of geography and equipment, which affect naval operations profoundly. Moreover the separate identification of tasks by coast, when coupled with a description of available resources, would emphasize the duty to offer adequate protection to all three — Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic — and would reduce the possibility of one or another being neglected. The current lack of differentiation in the list of tasks, together with DND's custom of aggregating the tally of available resources, means that declining capability in one area, or a shift in resources is not readily apparent.

*(c) Problems of content.*

Turning to content, the sub-committee is disturbed by the apparent lack of inclination to include military input into the design and purchase of vessels and aircraft for non-military government fleets. A glaring gap in the list is the absence of any reference to the task of identifying other governmental and private-sector resources which could be employed by the military or adapted to military use in time of war. Nor is there any reference to planning for the mobilization of such resources. It may be that the task of providing "a mobilization capability" (10.06) is designed to cover all of these matters; but if it is, it is expressed far too vaguely.

Perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that the list makes no precise reference to Canada's need for a capability to defend itself under certain circumstances. For example, the document does not seem to envisage situations short of a major East-West conflict or situations in which the U.S. would not be involved as an active ally. There is no clear reference to the task of sea-denial in Canadian waters, for example. Where there is reference to a purely Canadian military task — locating and neutralizing mines — all evidence points to the conclusion that Canada does not have the necessary equipment.

The description of tasks calls for MARCOM to "escort the seaborne elements of the CAST (Canadian Air/Sea Transportable) Group to Northern European waters" (task 10.20). That commitment poses a number of serious problems for MARCOM. If movement was authorized in a crisis period, before the start of hostilities, then the activities of the CAST force could very well add to the tension and heighten the danger of an outbreak of war. If Canada waited until it was politically acceptable to send the force, then it might not be possible to get it underway before the Warsaw Pact launched an assault on North Norway — which would entail the cancellation of the operation since the government has indicated that it would not send the CAST force after hostilities had broken out. Alternatively, the force might be under way but not have completed its movements by the time of a Warsaw Pact attack and could thus be caught in an exposed situation, in some region such as the Norwegian Sea. Losses to personnel, transports and escorts could be extremely heavy.

An additional problem with the CAST commitment is the difficulty of evacuating the force by sea. If this became necessary, very heavy losses might be sustained. Also, there is currently a shortage of suitable escorts. Present plans for ship replacement mean that it will be at least 1992 before Canada can hope to assemble a force of seven to ten vessels competent to escort the CAST ships (in