

to North Vietnam it would come to the whole of Indochina. Nevertheless, he said he wanted the Canadian channel kept open. Neither the United States nor North Vietnam, however, took any initiative to make use of it in the following weeks.

The Commissioner's third trip to Hanoi on regular Commission business was planned for November 1964, but we were asked by the United States Government to delay it to permit the preparation of a further message to the North Vietnamese. This message, which was relayed to Saigon on December 3, had nothing to add to the earlier messages beyond the statement that "the time is ripe for any message Hanoi may wish to convey", and the Commissioner was instructed by the Canadian Government to deliver passively so passive a message. It was conveyed, therefore, to the head of the North Vietnamese liaison mission for the ICC. This was the only North Vietnamese official whom Mr. Seaborn saw during this third visit, from December 10 to 18, 1964. There was no response to the American invitation for communication from the North Vietnamese and in January 1965 the State Department told us that it was unlikely that the United States would have anything to communicate to Hanoi "in the near future".

American air-attacks on North Vietnam began in February 1965 following a major Communist assault on American facilities at Pleiku and on February 27 Mr. Seaborn was instructed by the Canadian Government to go to Hanoi to discuss a new message with the North Vietnamese Prime Minister. He went on March 1, but Pham Van Dong would not receive him and the Commissioner saw Colonel Ha Van Lau, the head of the liaison mission, on March 4. At that time the Commissioner conveyed to him the substance of a general statement of United States policy and objective, which was also being made available to the North Vietnamese Government through the United States Embassy in Warsaw. Mr. Seaborn concluded, following this meeting, that the North Vietnamese were unlikely to use the Canadian channel of communication with the United States.

On May 28, 1965, following the suspension of bombing from May 12 to 17, the United States asked if the Canadian Government would instruct Mr. Seaborn to pass a further message to North Vietnam saying that "the United States continues to consider the possibility of working toward a solution by reciprocal actions on each side", and seeking clarification of whether American recognition of North Vietnam's "Four Points" of April 8 was regarded by Hanoi as a pre-condition to any discussions. Mr. Seaborn went to Hanoi for the fifth time on May 31 and saw both Ha Van Lau and North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. He reported his impression that the North Vietnamese were not interested in talking to the United States at that time. The fact that Mr. Seaborn had seen the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister was reported to the House by my predecessor, the Honourable Paul Martin, on June 7, 1965.

Mr. Seaborn visited Hanoi for the last time from September 30 to October 4, 1965. We had told the United States Government in advance that we had serious doubts about the usefulness of giving him special instructions and on this occasion he carried no message. His only official contact this time was at a low level in the North Vietnamese liaison mission and he detected