

defend itself. For the standard discussion of this, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978).

Third, cooperation may be a more effective option if states wish to communicate benign intent. Particularly when offensive capabilities are seen to have an advantage over defensive capabilities (hence represent an attractive unilateral avenue for enhancing security, if increased), cooperative policies that limit offensive capabilities can induce a positive shift in assessments of motivation by potential adversaries. Dangerous states seeking to use their military capabilities for gain will be reluctant to enter into such arrangements because they are counterproductive. (*Ibid.*, pp. 67-70.)

18. Mearsheimer identifies them as "liberal institutionalism," "collective security," and "critical theory." ("The False Promise of International Institutions.") Collective security does not appear to be directly germane to confidence building thinking although it can account for institutions that might operate in parallel with a confidence building regime. Some confusion exists on this count because the CSCE/OSCE has security dimensions beyond confidence building, some of which could be seen to have collective security characteristics (if only in terms of aspiration).

Mearsheimer's treatment of critical theory has been criticized for inappropriately lumping together different schools that have quite distinct perspectives. See Wendt, "Constructing International Politics." In terms of helping to understand confidence building, the most relevant of these schools (including "postmodernism," "constructivism," "neo-Marxism," and "feminism") quite clearly is constructivism. Constructivism and the structurationist approach (after Giddens) can be considered to be approximate synonyms for our purposes in this very elementary introduction.

19. Mearsheimer identifies (with justification) Robert O. Keohane as a principal contributor to this perspective. See, for instance, *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989).

20. For the classic articulation of the structurationist perspective applied to international relations, see Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International*

*Organization* Vol.41, No. 3 (Summer 1987) and Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992). Emanuel Adler (see "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of Nuclear Arms Control" discussed in the preceding section) is also a structurationist (p. 103).

At the core of the structurationist vision (and, indeed, virtually all international relations perspectives) is the "agent-structure problem." Wendt describes it in the following way:

"The agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life which underlie most social scientific inquiry: 1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors. Taken together these truisms suggest that human agents and social structures are, in one way or another, theoretically interdependent or mutually implicating entities. Thus, the analysis of action invokes an at least implicit understanding of particular social relationships (or "rules of the game") in which the action is set — just as the analysis of social structures invokes some understanding of the actors whose relationships make up the structural context. It is then a plausible step to believe that the properties of agents and those of social structures are *both* relevant to explanations of social behaviour. ... [the structurationist approach] requires a very particular conceptualization of the agent-structure relationship. This conceptualization forces us to rethink the fundamental properties of (state) agents and [international] system structures. In turn, it permits us to use *agents and structures to explain some of the key properties of each as effects of the other, to see agents and structures as "co-determined" or "mutually constituted" entities.*" (Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," pp.338-339, first emphasis in the original, second emphasis added.)

21. Wendt ("Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics") observes: