

should include sea-based missiles as well as those on land.⁵ The majority of Soviet nuclear warheads are atop land-based ballistic missiles, while the majority of US nuclear warheads are based at sea.

In May, Mr. Baker flew to the Soviet Union armed with a host of new proposals intended to break the START logjam in order that a declaration on the main principles of an agreement could be announced at the US-Soviet summit in June. After four days of tense and often marathon-length negotiating sessions, US and Soviet officials reportedly "resolved all major obstacles to a strategic arms reduction treaty."⁶ The "major obstacles" that were overcome involved the issues of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. The United States conceded to the Soviet position that ALCMs with a range of 600 kilometres or more would be included in an agreement. In return the Soviets agreed to the US counting rules, and also to exempt conventionally-armed ALCMs that could be distinguished from nuclear versions. This included the Tacit Rainbow, an American conventional cruise missile designed to suppress enemy radar, which was in the testing phase. According to the agreed counting rule, "each current and future US heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs will count as 10 warheads and may actually be equipped for no more than 20 ALCMs.... [E]ach current and future Soviet heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs will count as 8 warheads and may actually be equipped for no more than 12 ALCMs."⁷ It was agreed that the US could apply the counting rule to up to 150 heavy bombers and the Soviets to 210. Cruise missile-capable bombers in excess of those numbers would be counted as carrying the ALCMs for which they were equipped.⁸

The two sides agreed that SLCMs would not be constrained in a START treaty but instead would be included in a non-verifiable, politically binding -- but not legally binding -- declaration outside the treaty. Declarations would take place annually for the duration of a START treaty specifying the maximum number of SLCMs each side would have deployed "for each of the following five treaty years," with that number not to exceed 880.⁹

A number of issues remained in dispute, including numerical limits on mobile land-based missile warheads; restrictions on flight testing or modernization of existing heavy ballistic missiles, such as the Soviet SS-18; and the question of the Soviet Backfire bomber, which the Americans insisted posed an intercontinental threat, despite its limited range.

⁵ See: R. Jeffrey Smith, "Gorbachev Cool to Bush's Missile Proposal." *Washington Post*, 9 April 1990, p. A10; and Michael R. Gordon, "Soviets Rebuffed by Cheney on Plan Curbing Sea Arms." *New York Times*, 16 April 1990, pp. A1 and A8.

⁶ Thomas L. Friedman, "US and Soviets Close to a Pact on 30% Cut in Nuclear Missiles; Agree on Chemical-Arms Curbs." *New York Times*, 20 May 1990, p. A1.

⁷ USIS, *Wireless File*, EUR403, 5 July 1990, p. 8.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.