K9(G70)

Proposal Abstract K9(G70)

 Arms Control Problem: Nuclear weapons - comprehensive test ban

2. Verification Type:

- (a) Seismic sensors international network
- (b) International exchange of information

3. Source:

Canada. "Working paper concerning seismological capabilities in detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions". CCD/305, 10 August 1970.

See also: Sweden. "Technical working paper offering a comparison of two systems for verification of a comprehensive test ban". CCD/306, 12 August 1970.

4. Summary:

On 17 April 1969* Canada suggested that countries submit to the UN Secretary General, a list of all seismic stations from which they would be ready to supply records for the purpose of monitoring a test ban. The intent was to determine existing resources available for an international seismic monitoring network. This idea was resubmitted in a more formal working paper in May 1969.** Eventually, the proposal was incorporated in General Assembly Resolution 2604 A(XXIV). The paper under discussion here (CCD/305) is an assessment of the returns made pursuant to this resolution.

Existing seismic data resources available for any international network could detect earthquakes and underground explosions down to $\rm m_b$ 4.0-4.2, occurring in the northern hemisphere at 50% probability. At 90% probability the detection threshold is $\rm m_b$ 4.5-4.7.

Identification is more difficult; the threshold in this case being potentially:

- (1) m_b 4.0-4.4 for earthquakes at 50% probability,
- (2) mb 4.5-4.9 for earthquakes at 90% probability,
- (3) m_b 5.0-5.4 for underground nuclear blasts at 50% probability,
- (4) m_b 5.5-5.9 for underground nuclear blasts at 90% probability. Sweden later introduced a working paper (CCD/306) comparing that system suggested by the UK paper (CCD/296), abstract K10(G70) and that suggested by Canada (CCD/305), giving the following capability for both in terms of blast yields:

^{*} ENDC/PV.404.

^{**} ENDC/251. It was revised in August, 1969.