

make sense to look at the multitude of definitions that various authors have devised for the CBM concept. Although there is considerable variety, an effort will be made to make a synthesis on the basis of consensus of what most analysts mean by Confidence Building Measures. This discussion will also include an examination of the different methods of categorizing or distinguishing between the various types of CBMs and the different ways in which CBMs can be conceptualized.

Obviously, the most important aspect of CBMs is their future applicability. This means a consideration of the ways in which CBMs can be used to reduce tension, suspicion and fear of surprise attack. We will examine applications designed to improve the NATO/Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) relationship in Europe (primarily in terms of the conventional military balance) as well as the Soviet-American strategic nuclear relationship and conflict-prone relations in other parts of the world.

The study concludes with a general examination of the prospects and problems associated with CBMs. In particular, this study notes several serious flaws in the existing CBM literature. Although the specific complaints have to do with predominantly academic work, the effects and the concern extend beyond academic analysis. To a significant degree, these analytic flaws or oversights also reflect more basic habits of thought typical of both theorists and policy makers. These flaws therefore can influence negotiating positions and strategies, reducing the chances for the successful construction of meaningful CBMs.

The first of these flaws is a dangerous indifference to (or ignorance of) the idiosyncratic and complex nature of Soviet defence policy and military doctrine. The CBM literature very often makes disturbingly simpleminded – and sometimes surprisingly benign – assumptions about the sort of conventional military threat that the Soviet Union poses as well as ignoring

genuine Soviet concerns and habits of thought. This translates into a lack of sensitivity to a distinctly different set of *Soviet* military concerns having relatively little in common with Western defence problems – and solutions – in Europe. A similar insensitivity to a distinct Soviet “strategic culture” has been evident in discussions of Soviet-American strategic nuclear CBMs as well, but there is a growing recognition of genuine differences in that sphere.

On a more general level, the existing CBM literature, while recognizing the intensely psychological nature of Confidence-Building Measures in a *pro forma* fashion, reveals a paradoxical indifference to the “mechanisms” and processes that animate “Confidence Building”. This is most evident in the literature’s failure to incorporate the contemporary insights of cognitive theory when discussing the ways in which Confidence-Building is supposed to deal with misperception and misunderstanding. The Confidence-Building literature and, more generally, Confidence-Building thinking persistently overlook the role of exceedingly important “non-rational” cognitive processes² that interfere with the supposedly “rational” decision-making and information-processing activities that underlie Confidence Building. If Confidence-Building Measures are constructed on the basis of a seriously faulty understanding of how humans deal with complex images, beliefs, and fears, then CBMs may not operate in the ways hoped for and expected. The failure to explore *how* confidence can be created and increased between adversary states is a serious and potentially dangerous shortcoming of existing research.

The existing CBM literature is also indifferent to or ignorant of the complex reality of the defence policy process in the various NATO and Warsaw Pact states. Because CBMs neces-

² The generic term “cognitive processes” means, in the simplest terms, the way the human mind operates, the way it deals with the external world. More formally, it refers to the collection of “mental” processes that, together, explain: how belief systems come to be organized as they are; how information is acquired, sorted, categorized and stored, particularly according to the influence of existing belief structures; how inferences

are drawn on the basis of existing information and beliefs; and how learning, intuition, judgement, and choice operate, especially in an uncertain and unstructured environment. Cognitive processes are particularly important to an understanding of how faulty judgements are made about the nature and operation of poorly understood phenomena. Chapter Seven gives some hint of this greater complexity.

