

two columns. The one, of 200 men, went to St. Foix; the other, of 400, to Lorette. We took post at both places; and, so soon as they were secured, a corps of 700 men marched to St. Augustin, brought off the enemy's advance guard, with many cattle, and disarmed the inhabitants. These two posts were of the greatest importance. First, they gave us an opportunity of watching the enemy's motions, while they covered ours; secondly, they put, under our dominion eleven parishes, which greatly contributed to furnish us with fresh provisions during the winter, and whatever was necessary for subsistence; and at the same time relieved the garrison in the works they were carrying on. Lastly, by furnishing us with wood; an article of the utmost consequence, and which deserves a particular consideration. When the flee left us, we had, at most firing for 15 or 20 days only. Winter came on with hasty strides. The forest of St. Foix was the nearest to the town. We wanted nearly 16,000 cords of wood for the hospitals, guards, and quarters; and we had, at the time, but very little felled in the island of Orleans. The transporting it was extremely slow and difficult, as the river was then covered with floating ice. Very few days after we had secured the posts of Lorette and St. Foix, we set 200 fellers at work, and made a sufficient number of hand sledges.

Towards the latter end of November we began to distribute firing. The several regiments sent out all the men of duty with these sledges, and they brought as much wood to the garrison as they could drag. It is to be observed that this work was carried on during three months, at a season of the year which, for its severity may be said to be unknown to European climates. This alone may be put in parallel with the most fatiguing campaigns that ever were made in the Northern parts.

Our affairs then wearing a good aspect, and finding ourselves secured against any sudden attack, a detachment of 200 men was sent beyond the river St. Lawrence. They disarmed the inhabitants, and made them take the oath of allegiance. This step made us masters of all the southern coast, and supplied us with great quantity of fresh provisions. Some time before the French army had taken up their winter quarters, their advanced posts were at Point-aux-Trembles, St. Augustin, and Le Calvaire. The remainder of their army was between Les Trois-Rivieres and Jacques-Cartier.

The French generals being informed that our garrison diminished daily, by the constant and unavoidable hardships we were exposed to, resolved to carry the place by main force in the depth of winter.

In pursuance of that scheme they made all the necessary preparations. Rackets, or snowshoes, were distributed to the soldiers; and great numbers of scaling ladders were made. They even exercised their men to fix and mount their scaling ladders. The attack was to have been made towards the middle of February; and notwithstanding all their precautions to conceal their design, by cutting off all communication with Jacques-Cartier, which hitherto had been open to the Canadians, we were apprized of their intentions. The enemy, who had never lost sight of their project, sent a detachment to Point Levis, to take post there, to gather together the inhabitants of the Southern coast and strengthen their army therewith, and to form a magazine of provisions. The posts of Le Calvaire and St. Augustin were also reinforced by some companies of grenadiers. The enemy had been about eight days in possession of Point Levis, busied in heaping up a great quantity of flour, and killing 400 oxen for the subsistence of their army during

the expedition, when our light infantry, with a detachment of 200 men, dislodged them (we could not attempt it sooner, the river not being frozen over.) Their retreat being very precipitate, they left but few men. One officer and eleven private men only were made prisoners. But we became masters of the greatest part of their provisions. We took post in St. Joseph's Church until we had built two wooden redoubts, and mounted cannon on one of them.

A few days after the enemy came with a greater force to recover the said post; but having timely notice of it, some battalions were ordered to march over the ice to cut them off; others, with the light infantry, to attack them while they were besieging the church. The enemy finding themselves surrounded on all sides, thought of a retreat, which was so precipitate, that, notwithstanding our troops marched with all possible diligence, they only overtook part of the rear. After this retreat, we finished our redoubts, filled many trees, and secured our post from the danger of any fresh insult. The same detachment, that had attempted to force us, went, some days after, and took post at St. Michael, below Point Levis. We did not think proper to molest them, considering the great distance they were from us. It seemed now probable the French had altered their views; that they would postpone any further attack till the spring, and then form a regular siege: At least, all their preparations seemed to indicate it. They began rigging their ships, repairing their barks and boats, building galleys, casting balls and bombs, and making a prodigious quantity of fascines and gabious; in short, prepared everything that was necessary for a siege. We, on the other hand, made a great number of fascines, palisades and stakes to intrench ourselves on the heights of Abraham as soon as the season would permit. Whilst these preparations were making on both sides, part of our light infantry, with a detachment from the army, went and surprised the enemy's advanced posts at St. Augustin, Maison-Brulee, and Le Calvaire; and notwithstanding their alertness in retreating, we took 90 prisoners. Some time after, they hoped to take their revenge, attempting to carry off our wood cutters and rangers that covered Lorette and St. Foix; but they were repulsed.

Our circumstances became daily more critical: There was a great probability the French army and ships would fall down the river as soon as it opened, and (the ground being yet frozen) that we should not have time to form our intrenchments. These considerations obliged us to send the light infantry to Cape Rouge, with orders to fortify that post, as well to prevent the enemy's landing there, as to be nearer at hand to observe their motions: The works were hardly begun when the frost broke up. The enemy's ships fell down and landed their army at St. Augustin, and marched directly towards Lorette, in order to surprise that post, and cut off those of Cape Rouge and St. Foix. We prevented their success. The detachment at Lorette fell back upon St. Foix, and part of the garrison marched out and covered the retreat from these posts, with the loss of two men only. The night between the 27th and 28th of April, the whole French army was at St. Foix, and their advanced posts within musket shot of the town. On the 28th in the morning, our light infantry and volunteers marched out, drove off the enemy's van, and obliged them to keep at a greater distance. At nine our whole army marched out of the town with 20 pieces of cannon, and all necessary tools and implements to intrench themselves upon the heights of Abraham. We had just reached the ground when we discovered the enemy's van on the small eminences at the entrance of Siller

wood, and their main army marching along the road of St. Foix. As fast as they advanced they took shelter in the wood, and formed there. This was deemed the decisive moment to attack the enemy, in order to reap all the advantages that could be expected over an army not yet formed. In consequence of this resolution our men advanced. Eight battalions made up our first line, and two the second line; the light infantry and two companies of grenadiers covered our right flank; our volunteers, the rangers, and a detachment of 100 men, covered the left. As soon as we came within musket shot, our light infantry attacked the enemy's grenadiers on the left and repulsed them briskly. At the same instant the volunteers and rangers attacked their right (which also gave way) and made themselves masters of a redoubt the enemy had taken possession of. The center advanced posts fled without a blow. Whilst we thus obliged the van to fly, the body of the enemy's army advanced with great strides, and formed in columns. As soon as formed, one of their columns came to sustain the Grenadiers, pursued by our light infantry. They directly wheeled round the rising grounds, and took our right wing in flank. At the same time another column, headed by the chevalier de Levy, wheeled round our left flank. The battalions of the second line immediately made a movement to the right and left, to cover and protect our flanks. This was the critical moment; we were in danger of having all the forces of Canada to cope with, and our communications cut off. These considerations obliged us to retreat, finding ourselves not strong enough to resist, and not having been able to prevent their forming. We were compelled to leave our cannon behind us, the wreaths of snow and bad roads rendering it impossible to bring them off. We had 300 men killed, or taken prisoners in the action, and 700 wounded. The French lost according to their own confession, 2,500 men. The French army consisted of ten complete battalions (having been completed by picked men from the Canadians), 400 savages, and 7,600 Canadians, being in all 13,000 men. Our army, before the battle, was 3,111 men.

The French order of battle was, ten companies of grenadiers, two of volunteers, 400 savages for the van; eight battalions drawn up in four columns, with some corps of Canadians in the intervals; for the main body; two battalions, and some corps of Canadians on the flanks, for the rear; lastly 2,000 Canadians for a reserve. Such were their order and intentions, if we had given them time to form. The French opened their trenches in the night between the 28th and 29th. Their ships anchored at Foulon, below their camp. For several days they were busy in landing their cannon, mortars, and other ammunition. They worked incessantly at perfecting their trenches, and in raising batteries; and on the 11th of May they opened three batteries of cannon, and one bomb-battery. We made the necessary dispositions to defend the place to the last extremity. We planted cannon on every bastion, and even on the curtains. We raised two cavaliers, and made outworks. The enemy cannonaded us briskly the first day; but our artillery (which had already obliged them to change their attack) soon silenced them, and their fire slackened daily. Before they opened their batteries we had 132 pieces of cannon placed on our ramparts, mostly dragged there by the soldiery. Notwithstanding this formidable artillery, we were so circumstanced, that, had a French fleet appeared first in the river, the place must inevitably have fallen, though we had resolved to make, and should certainly have made, the most vigorous and obstinate resistance. The 9th of May one of our frigates anchored in the basin, and