

clusions," he says, "are we then led respecting the nature and extent of the scholastic logic? I think to the following: that it is not a science, but a collection of scientific truths, too incomplete to form a system of themselves, and not sufficiently fundamental to serve as the foundation upon which a perfect system may rest."

In order that it may be understood in what sense it is held that *the foundation of the scholastic logic is defective*, we make two other quotations. "That which may be regarded as essential in the spirit and procedure of the Aristotelian, and of all cognate systems of logic, is the attempted classification of the allowable forms of inference, and the distinct reference of those forms, collectively or individually, to some general principle of an axiomatic nature, such as the Dictum of Aristotle." Again: "Aristotle's Dictum de omni et nullo is a self-evident principle, but it is not found among those ultimate laws of the reasoning faculty to which all other laws, however plain and self-evident, admit of being traced, and from which they may in strictest order of scientific evolution be deduced. For though of every science the fundamental truths are usually the most simple of apprehension, yet is not that simplicity the criterion by which their title to be regarded as fundamental must be judged. This must be sought for in the nature and extent of the structure which they are capable of supporting. Taking this view, Leibnitz appears to me to have judged correctly when he assigned to the principle of contradiction a fundamental place in logic; for we have seen the consequences of that law of thought of which it is the axiomatic expression." The sum of what is contained in these passages, in so far as they bear on the point before us, is, 1st, That the foundation of the Aristotelian, and of all cognate systems of logic, is some such canon as the Dictum; 2nd, That that canon, and other maxims of a like description, though self-evident, are not deep enough to serve as a basis for a science of logic in which all the forms of thought are to be exhibited; and, 3rd, That the principle sufficiently fundamental to form the basis of a complete science of logic is the principle of contradiction. Now what is the real state of the case? Nothing is more certain than that the Dictum was not considered by Aristotle as either the exclusive or the ultimate foundation of his logical system. Not the exclusive foundation; for, as a matter of fact, many of the forms of thought embraced in the Aristotelian logic receive no direct warrant from the Dictum,