

of the Saluda, Broad River, and the Wateree, on the 16th, and entering Columbia in triumph, HAMPTON's troops evacuating the city as the Federals marched in.

The next evening, 17th February, the city, which was the capital of South Carolina, was set on fire and pillaged, as nearly the whole city and public and private buildings were destroyed; the capitol library, a very valuable one, and the archives of the State, the Governor's residence, and even the residence of General HAMPTON, two miles from the city. A great and keen controversy has arisen as to whether it was done by the direct orders of the Federal General. The fact is denied by General SHERMAN in the most emphatic manner, and history may well accept his denial as being strictly correct. All that can be said is: if he issued no order in the affirmative, he was equally reticent as to the negative; and his troops, knowing full well that Atlanta and other cities had been destroyed for military purposes, assumed the same necessity existed in the case of Columbia, and besides, as they were expert pillagers, burning the city was tantamount to *looting* made easy. At any rate, it furnishes the best example of one of those cases of mere wanton destruction, benefitting no cause, to which we have already alluded.

On the same night, HARDEE evacuated Charleston, setting what remained of the city, the squadron in the harbour, and the defences, on fire. The occupation of Branchville and Columbia left only one railway open to him—the North East—running through Florence to Cheraw. With a force of about 9000 men; he rapidly retreated by railway, to endeavor to form a junction with the forces under BEAUREGARD, well in advance of SHERMAN's victorious troops. They narrowly escaped capture by SHERMAN's right wing; but by falling back rapidly on Fayetteville and Goldsboro, and effecting a junction with the garrisons retiring from Wilmington, they succeeded in uniting with the remnants of the Army of the West, now concentrated under General JOHNSON, who had been reinstated in command at the last moment.

The Federal troops had been for some time in possession of Fort Fisher, on the Peninsula at the mouth of Cape Fear river, below Wilmington. From the latter city, the Wilmington and Weldon Railway formed a junction with the North Carolina from Newberne at the mouth of the Neuse river at Goldsboro. In midwinter, the whole of the 25th corps of the Federal army, with its artillery and horses, were transported to Cape Fear and Newberne. It was the operations of this corps under General SCHOFIELD that compelled the evacuation of Wilmington, and the manoeuvres of the Confederate forces were now directed to prevent a junction of that corps with General SHERMAN, as well as to baffle his attempt on Goldsboro.

General SCHOFIELD, though in possession

of the termini of the railways to that city, was detained till the first week in March for want of transport—engines and rolling stock—the Confederates having taken the *plant* to Goldsboro. During this time SHERMAN had advanced along the Charlotte and South Carolina Railway to Wimboboro, leading the Confederates to believe that it was his intention to move on Charlotte; but it had become necessary to open communications with the sea, as the country was unable to furnish supplies. Turning east, he marched through a hilly and difficult country, crossing the Catawaba river, near the spot where CORNWALLIS's last victory was obtained, in 1780; bridged Lynch Creek; and on the 3rd March entered Cheraw, where he captured twenty five guns and a quantity of ammunition brought by HARDEE from Charleston. They had been abandoned by the Confederates for want of transport.

After remaining for two or three days at Cheraw, General SHERMAN crossed the Great Pedee river on the 6th March, and marched on Fayetteville on the Cape Fear River, beyond which the Confederate forces had retreated, having abandoned many defensible positions, and only opposed unimportant cavalry skirmishes to the advance of the Federal troops, and these latter reached the Cape Fear River on the 8th of March, and crossed it by the 12th. SCHOFIELD, advancing with his force in two columns from Newberne and Wilmington, reached Kingston on the Neuse on the 11th March. The Confederate General, JOHNSON, was concentrating the remnants of the scattered armies of the West in front of Raleigh, covering Goldsboro; and appearances indicated that somewhere between that town and Fayetteville a decisive action would be fought.

As Goldsboro was SHERMAN's objective, and as it was necessary to open early communication with the sea, he sent orders by means of the Cape Fear River to SCHOFIELD to press forward to Goldsboro and meet him there on the 20th of March; and having destroyed the important arsenal at Fayetteville, he commenced his march on that point for the purpose of forming a junction with SCHOFIELD's force. The Confederate General, HARDEE, had succeeded in uniting his troops with the retreating garrison of Wilmington, and was now on the left front of the Federal forces. By skilful manoeuvres, General SHERMAN led HARDEE to believe that Raleigh was his real objective; and in order to confirm that idea, attacked him in force at Averbysboro, on the 15th March. The Confederates maintained their ground till night put an end to the contest, and then retreated, falling back on JOHNSON's force, with which they united near Smithfield, between Raleigh and Goldsboro.

On the following day, General SHERMAN detailed one division in pursuit, and moved forward to Goldsboro, halting on the 18th within twenty seven miles of it. In this position he was attacked by the Confed-

erates under JOHNSON, on the 19th, and a fierce action was maintained during the day—the object being to crush the exposed left flank of the Federal army; but Gen. SHERMAN, who commanded that wing, deployed four divisions, with which he kept the Confederates at bay; and another division coming up in support, he entrenched his position, so as to make it secure.

While the left wing was thus engaged, the right and centre effected a junction with SCHOFIELD, who entered Goldsboro on the 20th, throwing a bridge over the Neuse, ten miles above the town. JOHNSON had failed in the attempt to overwhelm the left wing of the Federal forces; assumed a strong position, covering Raleigh; but it was not the intention of the Federal General to deliver battle, and therefore by a few judicious operations he compelled his opponent to abandon his pickets and wounded, and retreat precipitately. The whole Federal army was concentrated at Goldsboro on the 21st March,—thus bringing to a successful issue the second *Great March* in working out the problem of the strategy of invasion in the late war, and the *fourth* which has been undertaken in modern days on this continent.

The following article has been republished in the *U. S. Army and Navy Journal* of the 23rd ult., and it is inserted here because it shows fairly how our military organization is appreciated by the people best capable of judging of its value, both from their proximity and the practical experience they have acquired in the management of a *Citizen Army* themselves. Such recognitions are particularly valuable in the light of the fact that English military journals are too much inclined to treat with a certain degree of superciliousness everything connected with the Canadian army, and readily fasten on every misrepresentation that appears to tell against its efficiency.

In this extract, the *Boston Globe* points out most clearly the vast advantages of the organization for its mobility, and the ease with which it could be augmented from the reserves; so that eventually every man physically capable of handling a musket could be placed in the field. As the force has been organized for purely defensive purposes, our contemporary is right in assuming that the probability is on the side of the *average Canadian* taxing himself in time and money, in order to fit himself to take his part in the military duties which *national pride, loyalty to his Sovereign, and self-preservation* demand of him. The military force, as it now stands, is maintained quite as much by private sacrifices as by public money: in fact, it is a question that, if the individual loss of time for which there is no remuneration at the annual drill by the rank and file, and the actual money outlay of the officers as well as loss of their time, were added together, whether the amount would not be equal to the \$1,500,-