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Ottawa, 6th July, 1944.

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MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET WAR COMMITTEE FROM THE ADVISORY  
COMMITTEE ON POST-HOSTILITIES PROBLEMS.

Post-War Defence Arrangements with the United States:  
Preliminary Report.

The Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems presents for the consideration of the Cabinet War Committee the following preliminary report on post-war defence relations between Canada and the United States. This report is based on a paper prepared by the Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems which has been considered and revised by the Advisory Committee. The Working Committee has asked for guidance on the tentative conclusions expressed in this paper in order to assist them in more detailed studies.

1. This aspect of Canadian defence policy cannot be considered in isolation. There are three important lines of approach to the consideration of Canadian military policy after the war, each of which is closely related to the other two. These are:

- (a) Canadian participation in the static defence of the North American continent;
- (b) The Canadian relationship to the defence of the British Commonwealth and especially of Great Britain; and
- (c) the Military obligations which may be assumed by Canada as a member of the new world security organization.

2. Canadian defence arrangements with the United States relate especially to the first of these three aspects. If the plans are fulfilled to develop the present alliance against Germany and Japan into a permanent security organization, in which the United States is an active partner, the third aspect will in part merge with the first, because the employment of facilities on Canadian territory, especially air and naval installations, will be essential in order to ensure the rapid deployment of forces from North America against an aggressor in Europe or Northeastern Asia. Hence facilities in Canada will be required both for static defence and to meet aggression or the threat of aggression outside North America.

3. The connection between the defence of the British Commonwealth and Canadian defence arrangements with the United States is perhaps not so close. The common standards of training and equipment maintained by United Kingdom and Canadian forces, however, ensure that for a period of years at least Canadian military policy will be greatly influenced by developments in the United Kingdom, quite apart from the political considerations arising from membership in the British Commonwealth.

4. Long range planning must be based on an appreciation of the dangers of attack in the case of static defence and of the probable enemies in the case of a general war. It cannot be projected far into the future and it is suggested that a period of ten years from the defeat of Japan might be accepted as the basis for Canadian planning; it is recommended, however, that this period should be kept under constant review, and should be modified or confirmed by the Government annually in the light of the general international situation. Provided that complete victory is won and that it is followed by thorough disarmament of Germany and Japan, it may safely be assumed that there is no danger of attack on North America during the ten years after the war. Even if tension

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