

The Address—Mr. Pearson

world—state that they require, over the six-year period, external finance to the amount of \$3 billion, the greater part of which will be supplied by the release of sterling balances held in London. I believe that a Canadian contribution to those programs, even if it has to be smaller than we might be able to make if we were not bearing other and heavy burdens, would have a great effect, not only in doing something to improve the standard of living in that part of the world, but also in convincing the people there of our sympathy and our interest. It is for these reasons, Mr. Speaker, that the government has decided to seek the approval of the house for an appropriate Canadian contribution to the Colombo plan.

In dealing with these Asian problems we sometimes run the risk of differences with tried and dependable allies. And that brings me to another of the cardinal considerations which I think we must keep in mind, the necessity of preserving solidarity with our friends in the west—above all, of preserving unity of purpose and action between the United States and Canada and the commonwealth of nations.

During the past few months we have had some differences of opinion with our friends in Washington on Far Eastern questions. While I do not gloss over these differences, I should like to warn against exaggerating their importance, because they have not weakened the basic good understanding between us, resting as it does upon a harmony of abiding interest, and on the recognition of common values and common rights, one of which is the right to disagree as friends with each other, and the other the obligation, again as friends, to resolve these disagreements peaceably.

In spite of certain differences there is complete agreement between the Canadian and the United States governments on, among other things, four fundamentals: we agree that peace is now in jeopardy; we agree that the extension of soviet imperialism must be opposed; we agree that the principle of collective resistance to aggression must be maintained; and we agree that the main front which must be defended is western Europe.

Those, then, Mr. Speaker, are the general considerations shaping our policy—unshaken faith in freedom and realistic faith in the United Nations; awareness of the world-wide scope of the danger threatening us; respect for Asian opinion, and a desire to help the Asian people achieve a better standard of life; solidarity with our partners in the commonwealth and in the north Atlantic alliance; the determination to do everything possible to maintain peace.

[Mr. Pearson.]

Now I come to our policy on certain specific matters concerned with Korea and the Far East.

Almost the first issue which arose in this field after the house adjourned last September concerned the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. This presented itself in a concrete form at the general assembly on September 19 last. A draft resolution was presented that day by the Indian delegation calling upon the assembly to decide that the Chinese government in Peking should represent China at the United Nations assembly. Persuasive arguments could be adduced both for and against such action.

It could be maintained, and it was maintained, that the United Nations would have more chance of dealing effectively with the situation that then existed in the Far East if the Chinese government, which had effective control of the mainland of China, were represented in its deliberations. It was argued that the United Nations would be a healthier organization if dissenting views were stated within rather than without the organization. On the other hand, it was difficult for governments which had not recognized the Peking regime to see representatives of that regime seated in the United Nations. To seat representatives of the Chinese communists had also become far more difficult after the attack by North Korean forces on the republic of Korea had taken place. It was apparent that the Indian resolution, on which our delegation abstained from voting, would not command the required majority in the assembly, and it was suggested—the suggestion in fact came from the Canadian delegation—that the question of Chinese representation should be considered by a special committee. It was hoped that in this way the question could be deferred for a short time until a suitable solution could be reached.

It may be asked why, if our abstention on the Indian resolution showed that we did not actively object to China being represented in the United Nations by the people's government in Peking, we had not taken previous action in Canada to recognize that government. We had in fact, as the house knows, given serious consideration to such action. We had been impressed by the argument that recognition by Canada and other countries would facilitate the representation of China within the United Nations, and consequently might make easier the peaceful settlement of certain Far Eastern issues. We had nevertheless also been influenced by what still seem to me to be valid views about making such a change at that time, and by advice which we had received from