

But I think the differences in our two resolutions -- that is to say, the resolutions standing in the name of the Philippines and of Canada -- are significant. I should briefly like to enumerate them. First, it seems to me useful not to interrupt this general discussion on disarmament but to preserve, as I have indicated, the full opportunity which the existence of this item on our Committee's agenda provides for the representatives of all nations not only to express their concern -- for none of us could be exempt from the fateful consequences of ultimate failure in this field -- but also to put forward any views and proposals which any of us may have to contribute to the solution of the differences which still divide us.

Thus it seems to my delegation that it would be regrettable, prematurely or artificially, to interrupt the progress of this debate or to deprive the Sub-Committee, which I trust will be charged with the more detailed negotiations, of the advantage of any general views from whatever quarters which may be available.

The second point of difference is one of machinery. The question is whether this Assembly should seek in the matter of detailed and technical negotiations -- which obviously will be necessary if real progress is to be made in the field of disarmament -- to by-pass and ignore the machinery of the Disarmament Commission, which is the organ of the United Nations especially charged with detailed responsibilities in this field.

This question, that is to say, whether we should use or by-pass the machinery of the Disarmament Commission, is also closely bound up with the question of timing. The Philippine draft resolution, with whose basic objectives, as I have already said I am in harmony, would provide an arbitrary deadline -- specifically the deadline, I believe is 15 November -- for a report back to this Committee, whether or not real progress has by then been made and whether or not the interruption of intimate negotiations which such a deadline would involve would be desirable. Of course, it could be said that the 15 November report could be an interim one and need not necessarily preclude further negotiation among the same countries. But is it not our experience that -- and I think this is only to be expected -- on a topic as important and as potentially controversial as this one is, a restricted group, if charged with the unavoidable responsibility of issuing a public report within a few weeks of beginning its functions, is likely to spend a great deal of its time during those weeks in the process of drafting and discussing the terms of a report rather than concentrating on what is, after all, the more important business of substantive negotiation. There is also the advantage that the Disarmament Commission is in permanent session. On the highly technical question of disarmament it seems to me fairly unlikely -- although we would certainly not wish to rule out this possibility -- that substantial progress can be made within a few weeks. If our draft resolution is adopted -- I do not say today, but later on, during the course of our deliberations -- we should like to see the Sub-Committee set up a group of working parties which would try to come to grips with the essential problems in a few key aspects of the subject, to see whether agreed papers could not be worked out on the basis of which substantial and definitive progress could be made.